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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S LICENSING LAW
JURISPRUDENCE: ITS NATURE AND INFLUENCE
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz∗
Abstract: The Federal Circuit serves as the central appellate court for U.S. patent law
appeals. Outside of patent law, scholars have noted the Federal Circuit’s distinct lack of
influence on the law. Thus, unnoticed, the Federal Circuit has become one of the most
influential actors in the creation of intellectual property licensing law. Its influence reaches
across all areas of intellectual property, industries, and all federal circuits and state courts.
But the Federal Circuit’s influence on licensing law is more than just a matter of academic
interest: licensing is critical to innovation in the information economy. Licenses underlie the
creation and distribution of ideas, information, inventions, and works. Products as diverse as
open source software and soybean seed rely on licensing.
The Federal Circuit’s influence emerged out of failed attempts to create uniform statutory
licensing law, which has left licensing law to develop as common law. Since its creation in
1982, the Federal Circuit has decided more cases involving licensing law than any other state
or federal court. Many courts have looked to and followed the Federal Circuit’s decisions.
The Federal Circuit’s general approach has been to uphold modern licensing models, which
fosters both technological and business model innovation. This approach is consistent with
the approach taken by most other courts, including the Supreme Court. At the urging of the
U.S. Solicitor General and others, the Supreme Court probed the Federal Circuit’s licensing
law jurisprudence in a recent case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. While the
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in a unanimous decision, upon close inspection,
the reversal actually amounts to an affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s core licensing-law
jurisprudence.
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Federal Circuit Licensing Law
INTRODUCTION
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982
to decide patent-law appeals.1 Congress hoped that the Federal Circuit
would improve the climate for innovation2 by giving inventors a uniform
body of judicial interpretations of patent law decided by judges with
patent expertise.3 Recently, scholars have debated whether the net effect
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence has been positive or not.4 Adding
fuel to that debate, lately the Supreme Court has decided an unusually
large number of patent cases,5 reversing the Federal Circuit each time,6
and causing some observers to speculate that the Supreme Court is
unhappy with the Federal Circuit’s tendencies.7
1. The Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction extends to decisions by all District Courts in patent
infringement suits, decisions by the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office, as well
as decisions by the U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(1) (2000). See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826
(2002); Paul M. Janicke, Two Unsettled Aspects of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Jurisdiction, VA.
J.L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://www.vjolt.net/archives.php?issue=30,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n1.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1989); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 821, 821–23 (2005).
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 12–17 (1981); see also
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 571–72 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
4. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Patent Law, the Federal
Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004); S. Jay
Plager, The Price of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2007, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 751 (2007); William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal
Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000); R. Polk Wagner
& Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105 (2004).
5. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.06[3][e][i], at 11-651 n.262 (2005) (“In
the past, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in only a small percentage of patent cases.”); see
also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 97 (1993) (“As a matter of practice, the
possibility that we would grant certiorari simply to review that [Federal Circuit’s] resolution of an
infringement issue is extremely remote, but as a matter of law we could do so . . . .”); Plager, supra
note 4, at 755 (noting that the Supreme Court has intervened when it appears that the Federal Circuit
is “creating special rules that are unwarranted”).
6. E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
7. E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and
Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28 (2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/eisenberg.pdf,
permanent
copy
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The cases decided by the Federal Circuit typically involve familiar
patent law issues such as patent validity8 or the scope of patent claims.9
Although other issues arise from time to time, the Federal Circuit’s role
is unremarkable except in one significant area of modern law—licensing
law.10 Unnoticed, even in the recent hot spotlight focused on the Federal
Circuit, is the fact that the Federal Circuit has become one of the most
influential forces in the creation of licensing law.11 On one level, this is
not surprising; one would expect the court to handle cases involving
patent licenses.12 However, the Federal Circuit’s influence now reaches
beyond patent licensing, across all areas of intellectual property and
industries, and across all federal circuits and state courts.
The Federal Circuit’s influence emerged out of failed attempts to
create uniform statutory licensing law. In the wake of these failed
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n7.pdf; Arthur J. Gajarsa &
Lawrence P. Cogswell, The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821 (2006).
According to Professor Eisenberg, the Supreme Court intervenes: when the Federal Circuit’s patent
jurisprudence is at odds with treatment of similar issues in other fields of law; when the Federal
Circuit has departed from the Supreme Court’s patent law precedent; to resolve internal disputes
within the Federal Circuit; when the Supreme Court seeks Solicitor General’s view and the Solicitor
General recommends that the Court take the case (this is important because there are no circuit
splits to show possible tensions in the law); when amicus briefs urge acceptance. Eisenberg, supra
at 29–30.
8. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).
9. See generally Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim
Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49
(2005); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis of the Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007).
10. In this article I use the term “licensing law” to refer to the law that pertains to intellectual
property, software, and information licensing. See generally JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999); ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING (1999); XUAN-THAO
N. NGUYEN, ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND PRACTICE 2–5 (2006); RAYMOND
T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 1:2 (2005).
11. Outside of patent law and the Federal Circuit’s potential influence on antitrust law, see
Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust Law for the Whole
Country?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (2002), the Federal Circuit has been notable for its distinct lack
of influence on other circuit courts. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 779. However, one student
commentator has also noted the influence of the Federal Circuit’s decisions involving standard
forms. See Christopher M. Kaiser, Comment, Take It or Leave It: Monsanto v. McFarling, Bowers
v. Baystate, and the Federal Circuit’s Formalistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.KENT L. REV. 487 (2005).
12. E.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This case is
discussed infra at Part V.A.
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Federal Circuit Licensing Law
efforts, licensing law has developed as common law. Since its creation
in 1982, the Federal Circuit has decided more cases involving licensing
law than any other state or federal court. With licensing law evolving
through the common law, other courts have looked to the Federal
Circuit’s case law for guidance in deciding licensing-related cases. More
will undoubtedly do so in the future.
The Federal Circuit’s licensing-law jurisprudence is more than just a
matter of academic interest. Licensing is a critical transaction model in
the information economy because it enables innovation.13 Products as
diverse as open source software and soybean seed rely on licensing.
Consequently, the nature of the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law
jurisprudence, like its patent-law jurisprudence,14 strongly influences the
climate for innovation in the United States—for good or for ill. The
Supreme Court undoubtedly understands this, as it recently reviewed a
Federal Circuit case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,15
which lies at the heart of the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law
jurisprudence.
This Article begins by describing in Part I the emergence of licensing
as the dominant transaction model in the information economy. It then
explores in Part II the development of licensing law in the United States
and how, in the wake of failed attempts to create uniform statutory
licensing law, the law has evolved largely as common law. This Article
then explains in Part III and Part IV how the Federal Circuit has begun
to shape this common law by deciding more and more cases involving
licenses, and how other courts now look to the Federal Circuit for
guidance in deciding licensing-related cases. In Part V, this Article
explores the nature of the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law jurisprudence,
focusing on its “first sale” jurisprudence. This Part also examines how
the Federal Circuit’s case law meshes with the decisions of other circuits
and the Supreme Court, including the Supreme Court’s recent Quanta
Computer decision.
This Article concludes in Part VI that the Federal Circuit has been a
good but sometimes imperfect steward of modern licensing practices.
This is well illustrated by the Quanta Computer case. In that case, the

13. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 2–5, 511–49.
14. See, e.g., Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA
Q.J. 1 (2006); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 36 (2000).
15. 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). See discussion of this case infra at Part IV.B.3.
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Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Federal Circuit’s ruling, yet
left the Federal Circuit’s core licensing-law jurisprudence relatively
intact despite numerous urgings through amicus briefs and academic
literature to send a stern corrective message to the Federal Circuit as it
had in several recent patent cases.16 This Article also highlights some
areas that the Federal Circuit should give heightened attention to, given
its highly influential role in the creation of licensing law.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF LICENSING AS A TRANSACTION
MODEL AND ITS CRITICAL ROLE IN INNOVATION

The story of the Federal Circuit’s role in licensing law must be
understood in the context of the evolution of licensing as a business
practice. Licensing—granting permission to use intellectual property—is
as old as intellectual property itself. The oldest intellectual property
statute, the 1474 Venetian Patent Act, mentions licensing in its text.17
Even though licensing is not new, its prominence as a transaction model
is new, driven by a shift in the United States economy.
The economy has undergone a profound transformation in the past
few decades, away from emphasizing the production of hard goods and
toward the creation of ideas and information. Today, Americans live in
an “information economy.” The commercial transactions of the
information economy emphasize the creation, distribution, and use of
intellectual property, services, and intangibles. As a result, the dominant
transaction model has changed from sales contracts to information
licenses.18 Licensing has emerged as an important transaction model
because it enables innovation, and innovation is critical to the United

16. E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the
rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393
(2006) (specifically objecting to the Federal Circuit’s approach).
17. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y
166, 177 (1948) (“[E]very person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this City, not
previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare
Board . . . . It being forbidden to every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any
further device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and license of the
author for the term of 10 years.” (emphasis added)).
18. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 2–14; see also MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS
OF SOFTWARE (2004) (describing the development of the software business and the role that
licenses played); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the
Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185–
86 (1999) (describing how licenses are the “unnoticed force” behind the open source software
revolution).
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States economy.19 As explained below, there are two types of innovation
in the information economy: technological innovation and businessmodel innovation. Licensing is at the heart of each.
A.

Technological Innovation: Licenses to Build Products

Licensing is a tool used by producers to build innovative products.
The basic personal computer system (“PC”) provides a good illustration.
A PC runs operating-system software, such as GNU/Linux or Microsoft
Windows. Although many see the “open source” GNU/Linux software
and the “binary use” Microsoft Windows software20 as polar opposites in
many respects,21 they share one important feature: both are built on an
array of licenses.22
If a PC is running Windows software, then the user is running
software created by dozens of programmers who are not employed by
Microsoft. Windows software includes many lines of code written by
third parties, small and large. It also includes inventions that are covered
by third-party patents and depends upon third-party information,
including trade secrets. Licensing is the primary legal tool that Microsoft
uses to include third-party technology in its Windows product. The
operating system may be called Microsoft Windows, but it is a more
innovative product than Microsoft could create alone because of the
third-party technology included via licensing.23
If the PC is running the GNU/Linux operating system, then licensing
has also played a key role in the operating system’s creation.24 Linus
19. Indeed, some believe that innovation is America’s sole remaining competitive advantage. See
generally 3 DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE
AMERICAN GROWTH RESURGENCE (2005); 3 DALE W. JORGENSON, ECONOMETRICS: GROWTH IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (2002); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1999).
20. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free Software
Movement’s Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1019–21 (2005) (explaining the distinction
between “open source” and “binary use” software).
21. See ROBERT YOUNG & WENDY GOLDMAN ROHM, UNDER THE RADAR: HOW RED HAT
CHANGED THE SOFTWARE BUSINESS—AND TOOK MICROSOFT BY SURPRISE 81 (1999) (discussing
open source products versus “binary” products).
22. A hot topic in the open source community is whether there are, perhaps, too many varieties of
open source licenses. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License Proliferation: Helpful
Diversity or Hopeless Confusion?, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009).
23. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 775,
776–92 (2008) (describing how technology companies such as Microsoft and Sun Microsystems
improve their products by acquiring third-party technology).
24. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING 1–8, 51–69 (2005).
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Torvalds is known as the author of the Linux kernel, yet Torvalds did
not write most of the code that comprises Linux today. Linux is the
result of the collaboration of hundreds of different programmers25 who
combine their work.26 From a legal point of view, Linux was created by
hundreds of licenses exchanged between the contributors to the Linux
project. Furthermore, Linux is only part of the operating system (the
kernel). Licensing is also the basis for combining the Linux kernel with
GNU software from the Free Software Foundation27 (hence GNU/Linux)
and other third-party code to create a complete operating system.28
B.

Technological Innovation: Licenses to Create Customer Solutions

After technology is built, the producer often wants to maximize the
way that it interacts with other technologies so that the product is useful
to end users. Again, the PC provides a good illustration. A PC may have
a CPU produced by Dell, a pointing device developed by LogiTech, a
microprocessor designed by AMD and fabricated by NEC, a keyboard
manufactured by IBM, speakers by Bose, and software written by
Microsoft, Mozilla, Apache, and Adobe. It may also connect to the
Internet because of technology created using standards by IETF29 and
W3C,30 and telephony provided by AT&T. In order for the PC to work
as a useful customer system, all of these entities had to share technology,
information, or intellectual property. Licensing allows this sharing to
occur.
25. Eric S. Raymond wrote the most famous essays on this collaboration: The Cathedral and the
Bazaar, Homesteading the Noosphere, and The Magic Cauldron. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE
CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE BY AN
ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 19, 65, 113 (2001).
26. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 172–79 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
27. See generally RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS
OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 28 (2002) (Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation and the
GNU software-development project), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
wlr/notes/84washlrev199n27.pdf.
28. See Richard M. Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in
OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION, 53, 65–66 (DiBona et al. eds.,
1 9 9 9 ) , p e r m a n e n t c o p y a v a i l a b l e a t http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
84washlrev199n28.pdf.
29. See IETF Overview, http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009),
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n29.pdf.
30. See W3C in 7 Points, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Points/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2009),
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n30.pdf; see
generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Policy and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
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C.

Business-Model Innovation: Licenses to Distribute Products

One feature of the information economy is the innovative ways that
distributors of information products have invented to get products to
market.31 Continuing with our PC example, we can see that PC software
developers distribute their products through Value Added Resellers
(VARs), Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), distributors (e.g.,
Ingram), and retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart). Software is distributed
electronically through email attachments, chat rooms, and via download
from thousands of web sites, web pages, and bulletin boards.32 Software
gets distributed in cereal boxes and with the morning newspaper. It’s not
hard to find software anymore; it’s hard to avoid software finding you.
What legal tool underlies these diverse distribution practices? The
answer is licensing.
D.

Business-Model Innovation: Licenses to Use Products

As I have explored in detail elsewhere,33 end-user licensing enables
PC-software developers to provide users with a variety of information
products at a variety of price points and for a variety of uses.34 Software
publishers come in all shapes and sizes and with a multitude of
31. See Christine Mumford, Businesses Advised to Diversify Content, Tactics to Keep Up with
Changing Web, E-COMMERCE L. DAILY (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.bna.com/products/ip/ecdm.htm (stating that customers can obtain information in many
places through many means and because of this, Gannett Co. has changed its “newsrooms to
information centers . . . delivering information when and where a customer wants it, on whatever
platform—be it in a traditional browser, on a blackberry, an iPod, or a widget on a Web page”
(quoting Craig Dubow, president and CEO of Gannet Co. Dubow, who attributes this change to
Internet entrepreneurs and fierce competition)), permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n31.pdf; see also Kim Komando, Avoid
Hassles; Let Sites Run Stores, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at E2 (describing a wide variety of
options for product distribution via on-line stores for small and large businesses provided by
Amazon.com, Yahoo, and eBay).
32. See Benjamin J. Romano, Microsoft to Add “Community Games,” SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21,
2008, at C1, C4 (describing on-line distribution and use of games).
33. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for
Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious]; Robert
W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software
and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 (1998) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, The
License Is the Product]; Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Romano, Microsoft Builds Virtualization Vision, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
22, 2008, at E1, E4 (reporting on licensing and pricing changes in light of new virtualization
technology).
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objectives. Universities, non-profit organizations, individuals,
collections of individuals, and small and large firms all develop and
license software to end-users.35 Free and open source software again
provides a powerful example. Because of open source licensing,
software users have the freedom to add new features and fix bugs and
the legal ability to hire others to do the same.36 End-user licensing also
allows software developers to offer packages of software and services;
flexible client-server computing-usage models; and the same code to
business users at one price, home users for a lower price, academic users
for yet a lower price, and charitable organizations for free. In sum, enduser licensing is a key component of business-model innovation in the
information economy.
II.

EVOLUTION OF LICENSING LAW

A.

A Body of Law Takes Shape

In one sense there has always been “licensing law.” License
transactions existed, so therefore practicing lawyers and courts had to
apply legal principles to these transactions.37 For instance, they had to
determine whether the offer, acceptance, and consideration were
adequate to create a contract. In a dispute over the meaning of
contractual language, they had to determine what canons of construction
should apply. In case of breach of contract, they had to fix appropriate
remedies. And so on. In other words, licensing law existed before the
label attached.
Only in recent times have scholars become aware of “licensing law”
as a distinct body of law, although it is a looser and less formalized body
of law (at least at this point in time) than many bodies of law such as real
property law, tort law,38 or even traditional contract law for the sale of
35. See Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33, at 897–98 (listing several nonprofit organizations that employ end-user licenses).
36. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L.
REV. 75, 75–76 (2002); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 18, at 181.
37. See generally STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
OPERATIONS (1995) (discussing law and practice of licensing).
38. Even though tort law now is considered “old school,” its acceptance as a body of law only
dates back to the turn of the century. In 1941, Professor William L. Prosser commented in his first
treatise on the law of torts that there was no recognition of torts as a distinct branch of law in the
mid to late 1800s, and as late as 1871 “the leading American legal periodical said that ‘We are
inclined to think that Torts is not a proper subject for a law book.’” See WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 23–24 (1st ed. 1941).
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goods.39 There is a large and diverse collection of laws that bear on and
shape licenses.40
Contract law is one of the most important ingredients in licensing law.
Licenses are contracts, so licensing law fundamentally involves contract
law.41 The principle is simple, but the reality is complex. Contract law
related to licensing comes from a wide variety of different sources,
including the common law, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC 2”), and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.42 Besides
contract law, intellectual property law is an important aspect of licensing
law. Intellectual property law influences licenses in a variety of ways.
Intellectual property law provides contract rules in some instances, such
as a statute of frauds for exclusive copyright licenses.43 In other cases, it
provides the backdrop for licenses and influences their content and
interpretation.44 In still other cases, the fact that intellectual property is
the subject of the contract places boundaries around freedom of contract.
These boundaries, expressed in terms of antitrust, misuse, and
preemption, are an important aspect of licensing law.45
The contract law applicable to license transactions began as common
law, and has never changed for pure intellectual-property licenses, such
as patent and trademark licenses.46 However, with the rise of the
software industry, many courts began to look on software transactions as
akin to sales of goods (as they often seemed, as the software was
embedded in computer hardware or distributed in boxes). Thus, many
courts looked to UCC 2 as the primary source of contract law.47

39. See generally U.C.C. Art. 2 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
40. For example: contract, intellectual property, consumer protection, constitutional, and antitrust
law. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 14–39.
41. See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A] license is a
contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.” (internal citations omitted)). Some
in the free and open software community have argued that open source licenses are not contracts,
but that argument is questionable. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in
License Contracts: Tales From a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 345–
46 (2009).
42. See id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000).
44. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989) (construing license grant
with reference to copyright policy).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (antitrust);
Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (misuse).
46. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 14–15.
47. Id. at § 15-18.
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In the 1990s, many people began to see the need for a cohesive body
of contract law for licensing software and information.48 The
organizations that created the Uniform Commercial Code—the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and
the American Law Institute (ALI)—initially decided to address it by
adding it to the agenda of the re-write of UCC 2, which was already in
progress.49 When this approach proved to be inadequate, they set out to
create a separate article of the UCC to deal specifically with licenses.50
This statute was to be known as UCC Article 2B (UCC Article 2 for
sales, 2A for leases, and 2B for licenses).51
B.

The UCC Article 2B and Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) Experiment

The Article 2B project created intense debate, especially about the
interplay between contract law and intellectual property law,52
enforceability of mass-market licenses,53 and use of electronic selfhelp.54 The ALI eventually withdrew its support. Nonetheless, NCCUSL
48. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281 (1993).
49. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and
Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994).
50. See Thom Weidlich, Commission Plans New U.C.C. Article: Committee Prepares to Draft
Proposal on Licensing, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at B1.
51. See id.
52. See U.C.I.T.A. § 105 (2000) (“Relation to Federal Law”); David McGowan, Free
Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy,
Information Transactions, and “Aggressive Neutrality,” 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998);
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998). In response to criticisms about the intellectual
property/contract law interplay, the 2002 Amendments to UCITA limit a licensor’s ability to
prohibit reverse engineering by contract. U.C.I.T.A. § 118 (2002) (“Terms Relating to
Interoperability and Reverse Engineering”); see also Jonathan Band, Closing the Interoperability
Gap: NCCUSL’s Adoption of a Reverse Engineering Exception in UCITA, COMPUTER & INTERNET
LAW, May 2002, at 1. Compare this approach to the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), discussed infra at Part VI.A.
53. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 112–13 (2000) (“Manifesting Assent”; “Opportunity to Review”); id. § 209
(“Mass-Market License”); Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33; Mark A.
Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 111 (1999).
54. See U.C.I.T.A. § 815 (“Right to Possession and Prevent Use”); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and
the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); David Freidman, In Defense
of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help,”
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998). NCCUSL’s 2002 Amendments to UCITA ban the use of
electronic self-help, even if the parties agree to it. See U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (“Limitations on Electronic

210

GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC

5/28/2009 10:46 AM

Federal Circuit Licensing Law
decided to move forward and renamed the project the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). NCCUSL approved
UCITA in 1999, and Maryland and Virginia enacted it shortly
thereafter.55 Since that time, however, no other state has enacted UCITA,
and several states have passed legislation purporting to preclude any
contractual choice of law choosing UCITA.56
C.

The 2003 Amendments to UCC 2

NCCUSL and ALI set out in the early 1950s to create a modern code
of contract law for sales of goods. This new code, UCC 2, was
specifically tailored to fit goods-related sales (i.e., as opposed to sales of
things like services or leases of goods). Although UCC 2 is now
considered mainstream, its adoption by the states, at the time, proved to
take a relatively long period and was often controversial.57
As information-related transactions (including licenses) began to
emerge with increasing frequency and disputes about them began to
come before the courts, judges often looked to UCC 2 as a source of law,
despite that fact that, traditionally, the common law applied to
intellectual property licenses and services contracts.58 Sometimes courts
applied UCC 2 because the transaction at issue resembled a sale of
goods, but often the court applied UCC 2 simply because it provided a
comprehensive and readily ascertainable set of contract principles with
which the court was familiar.59 However, some commentators do not
believe this is sound,60 and an increasing number of courts have also
Self-Help”).
55. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2006).
56. Iowa, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia have passed such legislation in various
forms. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 554D.125 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329
(2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15 (LexisNexis 2008).
Legislation to prevent the application of UCITA has come to be known as “bomb shelter”
legislation. NCCUSL responded to some of the criticisms of UCITA by passing a series of
amendments in 2002, but no additional states have adopted UCITA. Note that Maryland and
Virginia adopted UCITA prior to the 2002 Amendments.
57. See Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA and the Continuing Evolution of Digital Licensing Law,
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., March 2004, at 10, 10–11 (describing the adoption process for UCC
2 and comparing it to the adoption process for UCITA).
58. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L.
REV. 459 (2000).
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been circumspect.61
In 1991 when NCCUSL appointed a Drafting Committee to revise
UCC 2, the issue of UCC 2’s applicability to information transactions
was placed squarely on the table.62 The UCC 2 process turned out to be
long and difficult for a variety of reasons.63 ALI passed a draft in 1999,
but NCCUSL did not.64 Eventually, the Drafting Committee was
reconstituted, a new Reporter chosen, and the scope of the project
narrowed from a complete rewrite to a series of amendments, which
came to be known as the 2003 Amendments to Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2—Sales.65
One of the issues that vexed the Drafting Committee was how to
distinguish between transactions in goods and transactions in
information. Ultimately, the Drafting Committee reiterated that UCC 2
was never intended to apply to information and revised UCC 2 to make
the point clearer.66 According to Reporter Henry Gabriel and Drafting
Committee Chairman William Henning: “[T]he definition of ‘goods’
was changed to make clear what has always been true—the term does
not include information.”67 As to transactions that include both goods
and information, the Official Comments state that it is up to the courts to
determine whether a transaction is entirely within UCC 2 or whether
UCC 2 should apply to only part of the transaction.68
61. See, e.g., iLAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass.
2002) (stating “Article 2 technically does not, and certainly will not in the future, govern software
licenses, but for the time being, the Court will assume it does” and noting a “legislative void” of
useful contract law for licenses).
62. See generally Nimmer, supra note 49.
63. See generally Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never
Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999).
64. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: REVISED
ARTICLE 1 AND AMENDED ARTICLE 2—SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS SUPPLEMENT 49–52 (2005).
65. Id.
66. See U.C.C. § 2-103(k) (2003).
67. See Henry Deeb Gabriel & William H. Henning, Introduction to 2003 AMENDMENTS TO
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2—SALES 1, 2 (LexisNexis 2003); see also UCC 2-103(k)
(providing that the term “goods” does not include information).
68. U.C.C. § 2-103 cmt. 7 (“When a transaction includes both the sale of goods and the transfer
of rights in information, it is up to the courts to determine whether the transaction is entirely within
or outside of this article . . . .”); see also the official Oklahoma Code Comment regarding UCC 2:
[T]he definition of ‘goods’ in this article has been amended expressly to exclude
information. . . . There are important differences that exist between goods and information in
law, practice, under intellectual property laws and even under the First Amendment. Given
these differences, a court fashioning the resolution of a dispute should not simply apply Article
2 by analogy or under a predominate purpose test, but rather should consider the issue, federal
policies and rules regarding information, the consequences of applying an Article 2 rule on
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D.

Retreat Back to the Common Law

Whether one views UCITA as dead,69 dormant,70 or still dangerous,71
the fact is that licensing law will not be codified any time soon.72 Article
2 of the UCC could have covered licenses but in the end NCCUSL chose
not to jump in. Thus, licensing law continues to evolve as common
law.73 The Federal Circuit has stepped into this void, setting precedents
established practice, and other relevant considerations.
OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105 cmt. 1 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (internal citations omitted). For
two recent cases in which courts have wrestled with this issue, see Wachter Management Co. v.
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 751 (Kan. 2006) (addressing a contract including rights to
software, installation services, training, and consulting, and ruling that UCC 2 applied to the
transaction even though software services were an incidental part of the transaction) and TK Power,
Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stressing that a case-by-case
analysis is appropriate in software transactions because software packages vary depending on the
needs of the customer; in this case, applying the common law because “most of the price was for the
development of software code” and because the contract for the prototypes was for “knowledge,
skill, and ability” rather than “for the actual material goods”).
69. See L.J. KUTTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE: PROTECTION, LIABILITY, LAW, FORMS § 10:8
(2009) (describing UCITA as “dead”).
70. Professor Nimmer argues that any final pronouncement about the viability of UCITA is
premature judged in light of UCC 2’s long and often controversial journey toward widespread
adoption. Nimmer, supra note 57; see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 491 (2002) (“UCITA maintains
the contextual, balanced approach to standard terms that can be found in the paper world.”); Nim
Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643 (2003).
71. See, e.g., David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [U.C.I.T.A.]:
The Consumer’s Perspective, 63 LA. L. REV. 27 (2002) (criticizing UCITA as a threat to
consumers).
72. The American Law Institute (ALI) has begun a project called the “Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts.” In ALI parlance, a “Principles” project differs from a “Restatement.” A
Principles project is appropriate when the ALI believes the law is still in its formative stage. As a
consequence, a Principles document “accounts for the case law and recommends best practices,
without unduly hindering the law’s adaptability to future developments.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1 March 24, 2008). “Courts can apply the
Principles as definitive rules, as a ‘gloss’ on the common law or U.C.C. Article 2, or not at all, as
they see fit.” Id. at 2–3; see generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay on the Challenges of
Drafting a Uniform Law of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 925 (2006)
(describing the Principles of Software Contracts project).
73. See iLAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002)
(noting a “legislative void” of useful contract law for licenses). Some of UCITA’s provisions have
influenced the development of the common law. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (looking to UCITA for guidance on formation of contract issue); Rhone
Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (looking to
UCITA for guidance on bona fide purchaser rule in patent licensing case); AGT Int’l, Inc. v. Level
3 Commc’ns, L.L.C., No. 02-CV-684, 2002 WL 31409879, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2002)
(looking to UCITA for guidance on duration of object-code license where copy of software is
delivered for fixed fee); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A
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that are shaping the landscape of licensing law.
III. CREATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
Until the 1980s, any federal circuit court in the United States could
hear a patent-law appeal. This led to divergent results in patent cases and
frequent forum shopping.74 Congress established the Federal Circuit to
unify appellate jurisdiction for patent appeals.75 In doing so, Congress
hoped to improve the climate for innovation by giving inventors a
uniform body of judicial interpretations of patent law decided by judges
with patent expertise.76 Since that time, the Federal Circuit has been a
strong “manager and developer” of patent law.77
Creation of the Federal Circuit did not change the appellate
jurisdiction of regional federal appellate courts in federal copyright or
trademark cases,78 or for state-law trade secret or contract issues arising
out of diversity jurisdiction,79 at least not directly. Indirectly, however,
things changed. The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
in cases where the plaintiff pleads a patent-law issue.80 As specified in
28 U.S.C. § 1295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of an
appeal from a federal district court if the jurisdiction of that court was
based, “in whole or in part,” on civil actions arising under “any Act of
Congress relating to patents.”81
Proposal for a Federal Common Law of Contract, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 1027 (2004) (stating that
this new federal common law could “accrete UCITA provisions into law as necessary if they
provided the superior alternative to the existing contract law model or as gap fillers to another body
of contract law”).
74. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1984); Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6–7.
75. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
76. See supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
77. R. Polk Wager & Lee Petherbridge, supra note 4, at 1116.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
79. Contract issues may be litigated in state court or in federal court under its diversity
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1338 (2000). See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.
Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09
(1988) (holding that a patent issue must appear in well-pleaded complaint).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). However, if the patent-law issue arises in the context of a case in
which the trial court does not have jurisdiction under § 1338, such as a case in which only contract
or copyright claims are pled, then the regional federal circuit (or perhaps a state appellate court for a
claim based exclusively on state law) would have appellate jurisdiction, not the Federal Circuit. See
Janicke, supra note 1, at 12. The literature on the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is voluminous. See,
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Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction sweeps in many
licensing-law cases. Naturally, the Federal Circuit decides cases that
combine patent and contract-law issues. On top of that, its broad
appellate jurisdiction often requires it to handle infringement and breach
of contract issues that arise from copyright, trademark, and trade secret
licenses.82 In other words, the Federal Circuit gets the opportunity to set
precedents on a regular basis involving licenses of all types of
intellectual property and involving all types of creative and innovative
works.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INFLUENCE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LICENSING LAW
A.

Defining “Influence”

Sometimes it is easy to see one court’s influence over another; in fact,
sometimes the influence is mandatory. A trial court is required to follow
the precedents of the appellate courts in its jurisdiction. A panel of
judges in a federal circuit must follow the decisions of prior panels. All
courts must follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Outside of these contexts, however, it is harder to gauge influence.
Cross-pollination of ideas is natural83 and encouraged across federal
circuits,84 but how does one determine the influence that one peer
appellate court has on another? Ultimately the matter comes down to
two things: practicality and persuasiveness. As a practical matter, a court
with a difficult issue to resolve and no binding precedents to apply will
look to other courts for useful on-point or related cases. Then, for a court
to adopt the decision of a non-binding jurisdiction, the court must find
e.g., John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The
Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 1835 (1996); Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 4; Larry D. Thompson Jr., Adrift on a Sea of
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal
Circuit, 92 GEO. L. J. 523 (2004).
82. E.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (addressing breach-of-contract and
copyright-infringement issues in open source software license); see also Gomulkiewicz, supra note
41.
83. In fact, circuits other than the Federal Circuit decide cases that influence patent licenses. See,
e.g., Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the assignability of
patent license); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979) (same);
Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972) (same).
84. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838–39 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Dreyfuss, supra note 2 at 60.
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that the reasoning of the non-binding case is sound, sensible, and
persuasive. With these principles of practicality and persuasiveness in
mind, I have adopted two criteria to test the Federal Circuit’s influence
in licensing law: absolute number of licensing-law cases decided
between October 1, 1982 and February 15, 2008 compared to other
jurisdictions; and the number of times the Federal Circuit has been cited,
followed, or quoted by other courts in licensing-law issues within that
time frame.
B.

Number of Licensing-Law Cases Decided

The number of Federal Circuit licensing-law cases is significant
because the more cases decided, the greater the odds that another court
will find a useful precedent to cite from the Federal Circuit’s “catalog”
of licensing-law cases. Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit
has decided more than one hundred licensing-law cases.85 This is far
more than any other federal circuit court in the same period of time.
As shown in the table below, the number of Federal Circuit licensinglaw cases exceeds the totals, respectively, of the Ninth, Second, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits, all of which tend to handle a significant number of
cases involving intellectual property. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
decided as many licensing-law cases as the combined total of the
influential Ninth and Second Circuits. Not surprisingly, most of the
Federal Circuit’s cases involved patent licensing, and most of the Ninth
and Second Circuit cases involved copyright licensing.86 Trademark
licensing cases were spread evenly across the circuits.87 However, the

85. Methodology: search of the BNA Intellectual Property Library database using BNA headnote
numbers related to licensing of various types of intellectual property: patents, software, copyrights,
trademarks, and trade secrets. The staff of the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library of the
University of Washington School of Law ran these searches. The searches identified cases decided
between the dates February 15, 2008 and October 1, 1982. For other articles using a similar
methodology, see Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from
the First Year of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2007-08); Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading
State Cases, 1940–2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683 (2007).
86. The Ninth Circuit decides many copyright cases because of its proximity to the movie
industry. See White v. Samsung Elec. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the Ninth Circuit as the “Hollywood Circuit”). The Second Circuit decides
many copyright cases because of its proximity to the publishing industry. See 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[A], at 3–40 (2008) (referring to the
influence of the Second Circuit in copyright-related cases).
87. One would actually expect the Federal Circuit to have decided more cases in trademark

216

GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC

5/28/2009 10:46 AM

Federal Circuit Licensing Law
Federal Circuit decided more cases involving software and trade secret
licensing.
Licensing Cases
10/1/1982 – 2/15/2008
Patent

Software

Copyright

Trademark

Trade

TOTAL

Secrets
Fed. Cir.

90

13

3

3

4

113

2d Cir.

1

0

36

10

0

47

5th Cir.

0

6

9

11

0

26

7th Cir.

8

7

13

11

2

41

9th Cir.

5

7

38

12

3

65

The number of software-licensing cases is particularly significant
because software cases crop up in all circuits and tend to involve
copyright and other non-patent issues.88 These Federal Circuit cases will
be directly on point for courts looking for cases to apply. If a court takes
an approach different than the Federal Circuit, it will create a circuit
split.89
licensing because of its jurisdiction over appeals from the Trademark Office. However, it may be
that most of these cases involve the underlying question of protectability rather than issues related to
commercialization of trademarks (i.e., licensing).
88. As software developers increasingly use patents to protect software, more cases involving
software have come to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
These cases tend to raise copyright, trade secret, and sometimes trademark issues as well as patent
issues. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection For Software: Still a Work in Progress, 8
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445 (2002). As firms focus more on the importance of intellectual
property as an asset in the information economy, many other types of transactions will also involve
licenses to multiple types of intellectual property.
89. The Federal Circuit decides any copyright, trademark, or trade secret issues applying the law
of the circuit from which the case came. See Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 2007). Often the Federal Circuit must intuit this precedent because the applicable circuit
does not have any cases on point. See Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2003). In the early 1990s, the Federal Circuit avoided a conflict over the issue of whether reverse
engineering software to discover unprotectable ideas was a Copyright Act “fair use.” The Federal
Circuit’s decision in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992), is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Sony Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Beyond the total number of cases, the Federal Circuit’s decisions
address a wide range of issues. These issues run the gamut: implied
licenses,90 federal-law preemption,91 enforceability of mass-market
licenses,92 first sale,93 applicable law,94 canons of contract construction,95
transferability,96 misuse,97 and antitrust.98 The sheer volume of Federal
Circuit cases combined with the wide variety of issues that they address
means that, as these issues crop up in other jurisdictions, courts looking
for precedent naturally will consider adopting (and in many cases have
adopted, as described in the next Section) precedent from the Federal
Circuit.
The range of issues enhances the possibility that even the Federal
Circuit’s patent-licensing cases will prove to be influential. In the
absence of an on-point copyright case, for example, a patent-licensing
case often makes good analogy.99 Sometimes the distinction between
copyright as a “thin” intellectual property right and patent as a “thick”
intellectual property right justifies a difference in treatment between
copyright and patent licensing,100 but on many occasions these
differences do not justify distinctions in licensing law. Moreover, in
software licensing where the software may be protected by both patents
and copyrights, it may not be practicable to apply different licensing
principles to the same transaction.

90. E.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
91. E.g., Bowers, 320 F.3d 1317.
92. Id.
93. E.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
94. E.g., Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
95. E.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
96. E.g., Rhone Poulnec Agro S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
97. E.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
98. E.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
99. See, e.g., Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (examining whether copyright
license or assignment can operate retrospectively); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,
973 (4th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that because patent law had a misuse doctrine, copyright law should
too). In intellectual property cases, the Supreme Court has drawn on patent-law analogies, most
famously in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (beta max case), and
most recently in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (discussing injunctive relief in patent and copyright cases).
100. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217.
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C.

Citations to Federal Circuit Cases

Many courts have cited to the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law
jurisprudence.101 These courts include other federal circuit courts,
federal district courts, and state courts. The relatively large number of
citations shows that other courts have acknowledged the Federal
Circuit’s leadership in this area. Looking more closely at the context of
the citations reveals that on many occasions courts adopted the Federal
Circuit’s approach.102 In several cases, including a leading case from the
Eighth Circuit on Federal Copyright Act preemption, the court quoted
from Federal Circuit case law.103 The Federal Circuit’s influence in
licensing law is particularly noteworthy given its distinct lack of
influence on areas outside of patent law, as several scholars have
noted.104
D.

Final Observations on the Federal Circuit’s “Influence” in
Licensing Law

Judging the Federal Circuit’s influence on licensing law is more art
than science, of course.105 It seems beyond question that the degree of
influence is more than trivial but less than dominant. The Federal Circuit
is not the only voice, but it is an important voice and arguably one of the
101. See Appendix I.
102. E.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Federal
Circuit, including once for its interpretation of Ninth Circuit law); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo
Cattle Co., 955 F.2d 1327, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We agree with the Federal Circuit that a
simultaneous assignment and license-back of a mark is valid, where, as in this case, it does not
disrupt continuity of the products or services associated with a given mark.”); EyeTicket Corp. v.
Unisys Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (E.D. Va. 2001) (adopting Federal Circuit’s categories to
classify licenses).
103. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Foad
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 828 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001); In re CFLC, Inc., 89
F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Solutia, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 433
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Natterman & Cie GmbH v. Bayer Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 253, 258 (E.D. Pa.
2006).
104. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 779. A study in the late 1990s indicated the Federal Circuit’s
lack of influence in most areas of law. See William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 277–78, 317–18 (1998).
105. Some patent-law scholars have used methods of statistical analysis. For a recent example,
see David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) and Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren,
Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2006). Other scholars have gleaned
important and interesting insights using less “scientific” methods. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do
Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005).
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most important voices.106 Is the Federal Circuit more influential than the
Second Circuit or Ninth Circuit? There is not enough evidence at this
time to reach that conclusion. Given the pace of licensing-law cases
coming out of the Federal Circuit, however, it seems safe to predict its
continued and increasing influence.107
It is also safe to predict that if the Supreme Court overturns the
Federal Circuit’s licensing-law decisions, it will have an unusually large
ripple effect. Almost anytime the Supreme Court reverses the Federal
Circuit it affects the parties, the lower courts, and the industries that have
come to rely on what seemed to be the established rule.108 The difference
will be a difference in the order of magnitude. An adjustment to the
Federal Circuit’s approach to licensing law will not just affect patentees
and those who use patented inventions. Widespread adoption of Federal
Circuit precedents means that an adjustment will also affect industries
that base their activities on copyright, software, and information
licensing. Furthermore, the reverberation will reach across all federal
circuits and the decisions of state courts.109
V.

THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
JURISPRUDENCE

This section will describe the nature of the Federal Circuit’s
licensing-law jurisprudence, primarily through the lens of its first sale
cases, but also discussing cases that challenge licenses on preemption,
misuse, and antitrust grounds. It will explore whether the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence is consistent with practices in other jurisdictions

106. See Appendix I, infra at 251.
107. Given the importance of licensing transactions in the information economy, it is safe to
assume that the absolute number of licensing-law cases will continue to be significant and will most
likely continue to rise.
108. See generally John Richards et al., Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006) (discussing
Lexmark’s reliance on Mallinckrodt case).
109. If the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is unfaithful to the intellectual property statutes or the
cases that have construed them, then it goes without saying that the Federal Circuit’s course should
be corrected. If an adjustment needs to be made, then an adjustment should be made. If that
happens, then other courts and the public will fall into line as they must and always do. My point is
simply that any adjustment made should be made with full awareness of the broader implications.
See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment
Risks After MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 381 (2007) (pointing out that the
Supreme Court’s MedImmune decision had significant negative unintended consequences for the
university technology-transfer community’s licensing practices).
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and Supreme Court precedent, including the outcome of the recent
Supreme Court case Quanta Computer.110
A.

First Sale Cases

We begin with a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on
patent exhaustion (also know as “first sale”) because, as mentioned
previously, this jurisprudence recently has attracted the attention of the
United States Supreme Court.111 This area is very significant because of
parallels and overlaps with copyright’s first sale doctrine. When
software is involved, the code may be covered by both patents and
copyrights, so the court must deal with patent and copyright first sale at
the same time.
The Federal Circuit’s first significant decision in this arena was
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.112 In that case, a manufacturer of
medical equipment, Mallinckrodt, sold equipment labeled as “Single Use
Only” to hospitals.113 When hospitals contracted with a service
company, Medipart, to refurbish the equipment for reuse, Mallinckrodt
sued Medipart for patent infringement and inducement to infringe.114
The District Court ruled that the “Single Use Only” designation on the
package did not prevent the refurbishment or the hospital’s further (i.e.,
second and subsequent) use under patent law.115 The Federal Circuit
reversed.116
The Federal Circuit held that patent exhaustion only occurs when the

110. Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
111. This area has also attracted the attention of commentators. E.g., Mehdi Ansari, LG Elecs.,
Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc.: Solving the Foundry Problem in the Semiconductor Industry, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (2007); John W. Osborn, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A
Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 643 (2004);
William P. Skladony, Commentary on Select Patent Exhaustion Principles in Light of the LG
Electronics Cases, 47 INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. REV. 235 (2006).
112. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For articles discussing the Mallinckrodt decision at the time,
see James B. Koback, Jr., Contracting Around Patent Exhaustion: Some Thoughts About the
CAFC’s Mallinckrodt Decision, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMAK OFF. SOC’Y 550 (1993) and Richard H.
Stern, The Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in US Patent Law, 15 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 460 (1993). For a more recent article, see Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of
the Scope of Patent Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157
(2007).
113. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.
114. Id.
115. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
116. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709.
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patentee makes an unconditional sale. By placing an express restriction
on reuse, the patent holder could create a restricted license rather than an
unconditional sale.117 According to the Federal Circuit, “Unless the
condition violates some other law or policy (in the patent field, notably
the misuse or antitrust law, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co.),
private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of
sale.”118
The Federal Circuit elaborated upon Mallinckrodt five years later in
B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.119 In that case, the
Federal Circuit explained:
[A]n unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the
patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device
thereafter. The theory behind this rule is that in such a
transaction, the patentee has bargained for, and received, an
amount equal to the full value of the goods. This exhaustion
doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly conditional
sale or license. In such a transaction, it is more reasonable to
infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the
value of the “use” rights conferred by the patentee. As a result,
express conditions accompanying the sale or license of a
patented product are generally upheld.120
The court reiterated, however, that “conditions that violate some law or
equitable consideration are unenforceable.”121
The Federal Circuit clarified, in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-OType Corp.,122 that not all manner of restrictions or conditions would
turn transactions from first sales into conditional sales or licenses. At
issue in Repeat-O-Type was a statement in the user instruction manual
stating that users should “discard old print cartridge[s] immediately.”123
The court ruled that to be enforceable the condition or restriction must
be explicit: “A seller’s intent, unless embodied in an enforceable
contract, does not create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use,
sell, or modify a patented product as long as a reconstruction of the

117. Id.
118. Id. at 708 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 703.
119. 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
120. Id. at 1426 (internal citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 1447.
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patented combination is avoided.”124 The court stated that this
“noncontractual intention is simply the seller’s hope or wish, rather than
an enforceable restriction.”125
A decade after Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit revisited the issue of
patent exhaustion, this time in a context very different from medical
devices or computer equipment. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling126 and
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs127 dealt with the licensing model for
genetically modified seeds.128 Monsanto licensed its biotechnology for
“Round Up Ready” seeds to seed-distribution companies who then
licensed the seeds to end-user growers.129 This technology allows
growers to use the pesticide “Round Up” for weed control without
killing the genetically modified plants.130 Monsanto’s license allowed
the seed distributors to incorporate Monsanto technology into the
distributors’ germ plasma, subject to certain conditions, including a
condition that the seed distributors would not sell seed to growers unless
the grower signed a Monsanto end-user license agreement.131 The enduser license with growers included the following restrictions: the seed
124. Id. at 1453 (emphasis added).
125. Id.; see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J.)
(ruling in an action under Section 337 of the Tariff Act to stop the repurposing of “single use”
cameras, that package instructions were not in the form of an enforceable contractual agreement, so
therefore the “single use” condition was not enforceable).
126. 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
127. 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
128. First sale legal issues aside, the Monsanto line of cases raises interesting, challenging, and
controversial ethical issues about food and agricultural policy. These issues, though important, are
outside the scope of this article. My analysis focuses solely on Monsanto’s general right to use
licensing for its business-model innovation, not on Monsanto’s business objective in using its
licensing scheme. For commentary on the latter, see Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints Via
Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1053 (2006); Richards et al., supra note 108; Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative
Impact of Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (2007);
The End of Cheap Food, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2007, at 11. See also a news article by Kristi
Heim, Agricultural Aid a Hard Sell, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at B1, which reports concerns
that the Gates Foundation’s new agricultural aid initiatives will be too technology- and marketoriented, including concerns about use of genetically modified crops. Heim also reports that
according to a farmer from Common Ground Farmers, a farming NGO, farmers share local seeds
with other farmers and cannot afford to buy seeds, let alone more expensive transgenic varieties that
often require fertilizer and pesticide. Id. She quotes the farmer as saying, “People do not know the
hidden agenda behind it . . . that once [farmers] get the high-yielding seed, they have to keep buying
it. Once you get in the system, then getting out becomes difficult.” Id.
129. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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could be used only for planting a single crop; no transfer of seed for replanting; prohibition on research or experimentation; and payment of a
technology fee.132
Scruggs, a grower, argued that he was not bound by any of the license
conditions under the doctrine of patent exhaustion.133 The Federal
Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “[t]here was no unrestricted sale
because the use of the seeds by seed growers was conditioned on
obtaining a license from Monsanto.”134 Moreover, as to the second
generation of seeds, there was no “sale” by Monsanto (or the seed
distributor for that matter) at all, so there was no “first sale” under patent
law.135
Shortly after the Scruggs decision, the Federal Circuit again took up
the issue of patent exhaustion in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom
Electronics, Inc.136 In that case, LG Electronics licensed certain patents
to Intel.137 LG Electronics’ license with Intel contained a provision
prohibiting use of LG Electronics’ patents with non-Intel devices.138
Further, Intel was required to notify its customers of the prohibition in
any agreements that Intel created with its customers.139 Intel then sold
chipsets covered by the patents to PC manufacturers.140 Intel provided
notice of its LG Electronics license limitation to the PC
manufacturers.141
When some of Intel’s customers failed to obtain the appropriate
patent rights from LG Electronics, LG Electronics sued for patent
infringement. The defendants argued that LG Electronics’ patent rights
were exhausted because they bought the chipsets from Intel in an
unconditional sale.142 The Federal Circuit disagreed. It held that the sale
was conditional because Intel was limited by its license with LG
Electronics as to how Intel could pass on patent rights to Intel’s chipsets,
132. Id. at 1333.
133. As explained infra at Part V.B.2, the McFarling case did not squarely address the first sale
issue.
134. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336.
135. Id.
136. 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
137. Id. at 1368.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1369–70.
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and because Intel provided notice to its consumers of the limitation.143
Because the sale was conditional, the patent rights of LG Electronics
were not exhausted.144 Thus, LG Electronics had the right to assert its
patents against unlicensed “downstream” uses.
B.

Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s First Sale Jurisprudence:
Comparison to Supreme Court Precedent

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Quanta Computer,
reviewing the Federal Circuit’s ruling in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom
Electonics, Inc., reveals what the Supreme Court thinks about the
Federal Circuit’s entire line of first sale cases. The Federal Circuit’s
Mallinckrodt line of cases was clearly in jeopardy in Quanta Computer.
The Supreme Court presumably took the case because the U.S. Solicitor
General’s office argued that from Mallinckrodt to LG Electronics, the
Federal Circuit had moved licensing law in a direction contrary to good
public policy. As discussed below, the Supreme Court, in effect, largely
accepted the Federal Circuit’s core approach from the Mallinckrodt line
of cases, even while unanimously overturning LG Electronics on other
grounds. In other words, this particular reversal fundamentally amounts
to an affirmation: the Federal Circuit lost the battle but won the war.
1.

From Mallinckrodt to Monsanto

The comparison begins with the Federal Circuit’s foundational case
on first sales versus conditional sales, Mallinckrodt.145 The first question
to ask is: Did the Federal Circuit ignore the Supreme Court’s case law?
It would be hard to argue that it did. Judge Newman’s opinion146 cites
more than twenty Supreme Court cases147 and discusses or quotes
several of them, including two of the most important cases in this area,

143. Id. at 1370.
144. Id.
145. According to the Brief of the United States as amicus curiae on the petition for writ of
certiorari in Quanta Computer, “The foundation of the Federal Circuit’s approach to the first sale
doctrine is Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (1992).” Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 14, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-937).
146. Judge Newman also wrote the opinion in the Jazz Photo case in which the court ruled that
“single use” package instructions were not sufficient to form an enforceable contract. See supra note
125. She was also on the panel that decided LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc.,
discussed supra at note 136.
147. See generally Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.148 and
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.149 Indeed, the
opening paragraphs of Mallinckrodt address the district court’s ruling in
relation to General Talking Pictures:
[T]he district court held that no restriction whatsoever could be
imposed under the patent law, whether or not the restriction was
enforceable under some other law, and whether or not this was a
first sale to the purchaser without notice. This ruling is incorrect,
for if Mallinckrodt’s restriction was a valid condition of the sale,
then in accordance with General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Electric Co., it was not excluded from enforcement
under the patent law.150
If the court in Mallinckrodt did not ignore Supreme Court precedent,
then the next question is: Did the Federal Circuit misconstrue the
precedent? In Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit was reviewing the
district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment.151 As such, the
Federal Circuit had to make a key factual assumption: that the “single
use only” condition was legally sufficient.152 According to the court,
“The movant MediPart did not dispute actual notice of the restriction.
Thus we do not decide whether the form of the restriction met the legal
requirements of notice or sufficed as a ‘label license.’”153 The court then
stated, “On this motion for summary judgment, there was no issue of
whether this form of license gave notice of the restriction. Notice was
not disputed.”154
Thus the narrow issue decided by the court in Mallinckrodt was
whether a patent holder could create an enforceable (via patent law)
restricted license or conditional sale. Not that the patent holder did, but
that it could.155 The court reasoned that Mallinckrodt could create a

148. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
149. 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
150. 976 F.2d at 701 (internal citations omitted).
151. Id. (“On review of these issues in the posture in which the case reaches us . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 703.
155. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because
the district court improperly instructed the jury that it must find Braun guilty of patent misuse if
Braun placed any use restrictions on its sales of the SafSite® valves . . . we remand the case for
further proceedings.”).
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restrictive license because a patent gives the patentee the right to exclude
“use” of an invention,156 and this right can be waived in whole or in part
(i.e., conditioned or restricted).157
For support, the court cited several Supreme Court cases that
approved of conditional sales or restrictive licenses, including General
Talking Pictures and American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,158 a case that
involved a “[l]icensed to use once only” notice that had been stamped on
metal ties for cotton bales.159 The Federal Circuit quoted liberally from
General Talking Pictures, in which the Supreme Court said:
That a restrictive license is legal seems clear. . . . [T]he patentee
may grant a license “upon any condition the performance of
which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the
grant of patent is entitled to secure.” . . . The practice of granting
licenses for a restricted use is an old one. So far as appears, its
legality has never been questioned.160
Summing up the Supreme Court’s case law in this area, the Federal
Circuit observed: “Viewing the entire group of these early [Supreme
Court] cases, it appears that the Court simply applied, to a variety of
factual situations, the rule of contract law that sale may be
conditioned.”161 And if condition or restriction is within the scope of the
patent grant, such as a patentee’s right to exclude use of the patented
invention, “then violation of the restriction may be remedied by action
for patent infringement.”162
But is this a fair assessment of Supreme Court precedent? One case
that the Mallinckrodt opinion cites but does not discuss extensively is
United States v. Univis Lens Co.,163 a case decided by the Supreme Court
four years after General Talking Pictures and cited extensively by the
Supreme Court in Quanta Computer. Some consider the Univis Lens

156. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
157. The Federal Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in E. Bement & Sons v. National
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) for the proposition that “[a]s in other areas of commerce,
private parties may contract as they choose, provided no law is violated thereby.” Mallinckrodt, 976
F.2d at 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
158. 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
159. Id. at 91. The Court also discussed the limited license in Providence Rubber Co. v.
Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869).
160. 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (internal citations omitted).
161. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.3d at 708.
162. Id. at 709.
163. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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case to be the Supreme Court’s last and definitive word on patent
exhaustion.164 Did the Federal Circuit give Univis Lens its due, or did it
misperceive its importance?165 The best interpretation of the General
Talking Pictures and Univis Lens cases, when read in context, supports
the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the latter case.
General Talking Pictures and the cases that it cites establish the
following framework for a patentee’s ability to control use of a patented
product: The patentee may make an unconditional sale of a product
under its patent. If the patentee does so, its rights under the patent are
exhausted and the user is free to use the product without further
interference by the patent holder. Alternatively, the patentee can make a
sale or license that conditions or restricts usage. If the patentee does so,
the person who received a product under the patent may use the product
only as conditioned or limited by the patentee. If the recipient uses the
product in another way, he or she infringes the patent.
However, a patentee’s ability to enforce restrictions or conditions on
use is not absolute. First, it must be done in an enforceable contract.
Second, the restriction or condition must be within the scope of the
patent’s exclusive rights. Third, restrictions or conditions are subject to
other laws, such as antitrust law and the doctrine of patent misuse. If a
patentee’s contractual condition or restriction is outside the enumerated
exclusive rights granted by a patent or violates some other law,166 then
use of the product contrary to the condition or restriction does not
infringe the patent.
With this framework in mind, General Talking Pictures and Univis
Lens fit neatly together. General Talking Pictures is fundamentally a
patent-infringement case. In that case, both a manufacturer and user
ignored the license restrictions imposed by the patentee.167
Consequently, the Supreme Court found that the manufacturer and user
infringed the patent by doing so.168
164. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 553 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-937) (characterizing Univis Lens as the last Supreme Court case
that “squarely addressed” the patent exhaustion doctrine).
165. Perhaps there is general confusion about the significance of the Univis Lens case. See
generally John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on
Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 643 (2004)
(“Sixty-two years later, Univis Lens is still misinterpreted.”).
166. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
167. See General Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 126.
168. Note that Justice Black’s dissent, id. at 128–33, echoes many of the objections voiced by
petitioner and the United States as amicus curiae in LG Electronics.
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Univis Lens, on the other hand, is fundamentally an antitrust case. In
Univis Lens, the patentee was using a license condition to enforce resale
price maintenance.169 In other words, the patentee was using license
restrictions in violation of antitrust law. The Court in Univis Lens barely
mentioned General Talking Pictures, presumably because there was
little need to cite it in the context of antitrust. Justice Stone’s opinion
instead, and appropriately so, focused repeatedly on the “price-fixing
features” of the licensing scheme, which the Court ruled were in
violation of the Sherman Act.170 In other words, Univis Lens does not
overrule or even refine the rule in General Talking Pictures—it simply
applied it.
2.

The Monsanto Cases

This brings us to the more recent Federal Circuit decisions in
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling171 and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs.172 What
have these cases added, if anything, to the Mallinckrodt decision on the
issue of patent exhaustion? The McFarling case adds little to
Mallinckrodt.173 The primary issue in McFarling was the enforceability
of a condition in Monsanto’s end-user (grower) Technology Agreement
that restricted use of seeds incorporating Monsanto’s Roundup Ready
technology to “a single season” and prohibited the grower from saving
for replanting any second-generation seed produced by the first.174
McFarling argued that this restriction constituted patent misuse because
Monsanto had impermissibly tied an unpatented product to a patented
one.175 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “[t]ying can constitute
patent misuse” but stated that “McFarling does not raise a typical tying
allegation, and the mere recitation of the word ‘tying’ is not sufficient to

169. See 316 U.S. 241, 253 (1941).
170. See id. at 243–54.
171. 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit also ruled on other aspects of the
dispute between Monsanto and McFarling. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (remedies); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(forum selection).
172. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
173. McFarling had signed the Technology Agreement so, as in Mallinckrodt, the validity of the
license restriction was not challenged on that basis. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
174. See id. at 1339.
175. Id. at 1341.

229

GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC

Washington Law Review

5/28/2009 10:46 AM

Vol. 84:199, 2009

state a patent misuse defense.”176
The court then went on to assess what it considered the unique feature
of the case: “the Technology Agreement does not impose a restriction on
the use of the product purchased under the license but rather imposes a
restriction on the use of the goods made by the licensed product.”177 In
other words, the license restriction applied to the second-generation seed
that resulted from the crops produced from the first-generation seed. The
key question, according to the court, was whether this restriction reached
“beyond the scope of the patent grant”?178 If it did, it could (at least
potentially) constitute a misuse of Monsanto’s patent. The answer to the
question was: “Because the ‘435 patent would read on all generations of
soybeans produced, we hold that the restrictions in the Technology
Agreement prohibiting the replanting of the second generation of
ROUNDUP READY® soybeans do not extend Monsanto’s rights under
the patent statute.”179
The McFarling decision broke no new ground on the rules applicable
to assessing a license restriction. If the court had found Monsanto’s
restriction to be an illegal tying arrangement or beyond the scope of the
patent, then it would have refused to enforce the restriction. Like the
Supreme Court in Univis Lens, the Federal Circuit in McFarling reached
its conclusion simply by applying the framework articulated by the
Supreme Court in General Talking Pictures.
The Scruggs case presents facts similar to McFarling. In Scruggs, the
grower had not signed Monsanto’s Technology Agreement,180 but it was
undisputed that Monsanto required all seed companies to place a notice
on all bags of seeds stating that the seeds were “covered by U.S. Patents,
that their purchase of the seeds convey[ed] no license, and that a license
from Monsanto must be obtained before using the seeds.”181 However,
unlike the McFarling case which focused on the grower’s patent-misuse
defense, the Scruggs case also focused on first sale and implied-license
defenses.182
176. Id. at 1341–42.
177. Id. at 1342–43.
178. Id. at 1343.
179. Id.
180. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 1336.
182. It appears that McFarling raised patent exhaustion as a defense in his answer, but the Federal
Circuit did not address the issue in its opinion. Presumably, it was not argued in the district court or
raised on appeal. See McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1340 (mentioning that McFarling raised patent
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The Federal Circuit rejected Scruggs’ first sale defense.183 According
to the court, patent exhaustion did not apply for two reasons. First, there
was “no unrestricted sale” because the use of the seeds “was conditioned
on obtaining a license from Monsanto.”184 Second, because:
[T]he new seeds grown from the original batch had never been
sold. Without the actual sale of the second generation of seed to
Scruggs, there can be no patent exhaustion. The fact that a
patented technology can replicate itself does not give a
purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology.
Applying the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of
self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the
patent holder.185
Does the Scruggs decision break new ground on the law of patent
exhaustion and first sale? Scruggs seems to line up well with the facts in
General Talking Pictures. In General Talking Pictures, a patentee
licensed an amplifier manufacturer to manufacture and sell amps for
non-commercial uses.186 A commercial end user purchased the amps
from the manufacturer “knowing that [the manufacturer] had not been
licensed.”187 Under these facts, the Supreme Court ruled that “the
restriction was legal and the amplifiers were made and sold outside the
scope of the license.”188 According to the Court:
[The effect of this for the end user was] precisely the same as if
no license whatsoever had been granted to [the manufacturer].
And as the [end user] knew the facts, it is in no better position
than if it had manufactured the amplifiers itself without a
license. It is liable because it has used the invention without a
license to do so.189
Likewise, in Scruggs, a patentee licensed a seed manufacturer to
manufacture and sell seeds for single crop usage.190 A commercial endexhaustion and first sale as defenses in his answer).
183. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335–36. The court also rejected Scruggs’ implied-license, misuse, and
antitrust defenses. See id. at 1336, 1339–41. Judge Dyk dissented on the antitrust issue but not the
first sale issue. See id. at 1342 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 1336.
185. Id. (internal markings omitted).
186. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 125–26 (1938).
187. Id. at 126.
188. Id. at 127.
189. Id.
190. 459 F.3d at 1333.
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user grower purchased the seeds from the manufacturer knowing that
they were licensed only for a single crop. The Federal Circuit held that
the license condition was legal (because it was within the scope of the
patent) and that the grower’s use of seeds was outside the scope of the
license.191 The Federal Circuit, like the Supreme Court in General
Talking Pictures, ruled that the grower was therefore liable for patent
infringement because the grower had used an invention without a valid
license to do so (from either the manufacturer or Monsanto).192
One interesting difference between the Scruggs and General Talking
Pictures cases is the nature of the technology. In Scruggs, the
technology was a seed that replicated itself—obviously the amps in
General Talking Pictures did not present the possibility of selfreplication. This fact, however, did not change the law that the Federal
Circuit applied. It simply presented a unique, modern, and challenging
factual setting in which to apply the law. Indeed, because of the unique
Monsanto technology involved, the grower who produced the new seed
was, to some degree, a manufacturer as well as a user, so to this extent
the soybean grower in the Scruggs case was more culpable193 (from a
patent-infringement point of view)194 than the movie-theater operator in
General Talking Pictures.
3.

The Latest: Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.

i.

The Federal Circuit’s Decision

This history brings us to Quanta Computer—the Federal Circuit
decision that caught the Supreme Court’s eye.195 Quanta Computer
challenged the Federal Circuit to apply its first sale jurisprudence to a
complex, modern business setting. The case illustrates one of the multitiered licensing models that have emerged in the computer industry.
Like many large computer-technology firms, LG Electronics has
entered into patent portfolio cross licenses with other computertechnology firms such as Intel, one of the parties in the case. Such cross
191. See id. at 1334–38. Unlike General Talking Pictures, however, the patentee did not sue the
manufacturer. Id. at 1333 (patentee suing the grower).
192. 459 F.3d at 1336.
193. More culpable because the grower infringed both the “use” and the “make” rights.
194. I recognize that some believe that there are higher moral imperatives at stake when it comes
to reuse of seeds.
195. The case was called LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc. at the circuit-court
level. 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

232

GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC

5/28/2009 10:46 AM

Federal Circuit Licensing Law
licenses generally vary in scope. A given cross license may exclude
certain technology or limit the ability of the licensee to use the cross
license to shield its downstream customers or partners from patent
claims. Often the scope of the license comes down to money. In the case
of downstream shielding, the licensee must assess whether it makes
business sense to pay on behalf of its customers in the cross license (and
presumably pass on such cost in its purchase price) or let the customers
pay for the patent rights on their own. These downstream customers and
partners are a diverse bunch.196 They include software companies (e.g.,
Microsoft), personal computer sellers (e.g., Dell),197 companies that
assemble computers, and end users.
LG Electronics has patents that cover two different types of
technology: microprocessors198 and computer systems.199 In its patent
portfolio license with Intel, LG Electronics “granted Intel a license
covering its entire portfolio of patents on computer systems and
components.”200 Intel acquired the right to sell its microprocessors
downstream under LG Electronics’ patents with one important
exception: the license expressly disclaimed granting “a license allowing
computer system manufacturers to combine Intel’s licensed parts with
other non-Intel components.”201
This exception is good news for computer-system manufacturers who
have a patent portfolio cross license with LG Electronics. These
companies already paid for the patent rights. They do not want to pay
again as part of the price of Intel’s microprocessors. For those
manufacturers who do not have such a license, however, Intel cannot
serve as a “reseller” of LG Electronics’ patent rights. These
manufacturers must purchase their patent rights directly from the
patentee, LG Electronics.202
196. As described supra at Part I.A, many firms team up in the computer industry to create the
product that we call a personal computer.
197. The court in LG Electronics refers to computer sellers as “OEMs” which stands for “original
equipment manufacturer.” 453 F.3d at 1371. The term “OEM” was created at a time when
companies like Compaq and Digital Equipment Corp. actually assembled computers. As the
computer industry has evolved, many of these OEMs have subcontracted or outsourced assembly to
companies that do this work at a lower cost. Thus, the term “original equipment manufacturer” now
is often a misnomer.
198. A microprocessor is a component of a computer system.
199. See LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1368, 1373.
200. Id. at 1370.
201. Id.
202. Or, the manufacturer could acquire microprocessors from a company that has acquired the
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The Federal Circuit applied the Mallinckrodt precedent to this
complex licensing arrangement.203 In doing do, its ruling seems
consistent with Mallinckrodt, Scruggs, and the Supreme Court’s
decision in General Talking Pictures. LG Electronics had granted an
expressly conditional license to Intel. LG Electronics required Intel to
notify its customers of the condition and Intel did so. Thus, when Intel’s
customers created computer systems that infringed LG Electronics’
patents, the customers were not shielded by Intel’s portfolio license with
LG Electronics, and so they were infringing LG Electronics’ patents.204
ii.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The U.S. Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to review the
Federal Circuit’s decision.205 The Solicitor General and several amici
briefs argued that the Supreme Court should use the case to overturn
Mallinckrodt and the entire line of Federal Circuit cases that rested upon
it.206 The Supreme Court took the case and reversed the Federal Circuit
in a unanimous decision, but did not overrule Mallinckrodt.
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court first turned to
the argument that the patent-exhaustion doctrine does not apply to
patent-method claims. The Court rejected that argument: “Nothing in
this Court’s approach to patent exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that
method patents cannot be exhausted.”207 The Court observed that
excluding method claims would create an incentive for clever attorneys
to simply cast claims as method claims in hopes of avoiding the
exhaustion doctrine. “We therefore reject LGE’s argument that method
claims, as a category, are never exhaustible.”208
The Court then addressed the issue of whether a product must
embody a patent in order to trigger exhaustion. The Court observed that
“the traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an item
right from LG Electronics to shield the manufacturer’s downstream customers.
203. LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
204. “[T]his conditional agreement required Intel to notify its customers of the limited scope of
the license, which it did.” Id.
205. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
553 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-937).
206. See id. at 14–20; Brief Amicus Curiae of Consumers Union et al., at 2–4, 21, Quanta
Computer, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109; Brief Amicus Curiae of Automotive Engine Rebuilders
Ass’n et al., at 21–25, Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109.
207. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2117.
208. Id.
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applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it does
not completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is
to be finished under the terms of the patent.”209 “Here, LGE has
suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products other than
incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE
Patents.”210 All that the computer assembler had to do to infringe the
patent was to assemble the computer, following Intel’s specific
instructions. Thus,
[e]verything inventive about each patent is embodied in Intel
Products. . . . Quanta was not required to make any creative or
inventive decision when it added those parts. Indeed, Quanta
had no alternative . . . because it did not know their internal
structure, which Intel guards as a trade secret.211
Finally, the Court considered whether Intel’s sale of chipsets to
Quanta exhausted LG Electronics’ patents. The Court acknowledged,
citing General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric,212 that exhaustion
does not apply where a sale is unauthorized. Here the Court found that
Intel’s sale was authorized, citing “the structure of the Intel-LGE
transaction.”213 It pointed to language in the LGE–Intel license that
granted Intel broad rights to make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer
to sell, import or otherwise dispose of products, free from LG
Electronics’ patent claims. The license agreement also purported not to
“in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would
otherwise apply.”214 The Court acknowledged that the parties had
agreed, in a separate license, that Intel would give notice to Intel’s
customers that they were not licensed to practice LG Electronics patents
in Intel/non-Intel combinations (and had given that notice to Quanta),
but it found that “Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the
LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision
to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.”215 If anything, the Court
indicated, LG Electronics might have a claim for breach of contract. But
LG Electronics did not plead such claim, so the Court did not address

209. Id.
210. Id. at 2119.
211. Id. at 2120.
212. 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
213. Quanta, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2121.
214. Id. at 2114.
215. Id. at 2122.
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that issue.216
At one level, the Quanta Computer case seems like all the other
recent patent-related challenges to and reversals of the Federal Circuit’s
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court.217 The Supreme Court emphatically
rejected the Federal Circuit’s notion that patent-method claims can never
be exhausted and clarified the extent to which a product must embody a
patent to trigger a first sale.218 On closer inspection, however, the
Supreme Court’s reversal in Quanta Computer really amounts to an
affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s basic approach to patent exhaustion
in the Mallinckrodt line of cases.
The fundamental issue from a first sale standpoint was whether LG
Electronics’ license had authorized Intel’s sales to PC assemblers (such
as Quanta). As explained by the Court: “Exhaustion is triggered only by
a sale authorized by the patent holder.”219 The Court found that, indeed,
LG Electronics’ license had authorized Intel’s sales “because the license
authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody the patents
in suit, the sale exhausted the patents.”220
LG Electronics argued that the license had placed conditions on
Intel’s right to sell. If it had, then Intel’s sale to Quanta might not have
been authorized. However, the Supreme Court found no persuasive
evidence of binding conditions: “No conditions limited Intel’s authority
to sell products substantially embodying the patents.”221
Notably, the Supreme Court did not overrule Mallinckrodt even
though it was strongly urged to do so by the U.S. Solicitor General and
others. It did not criticize (or even mention) the Federal Circuit’s first
sale jurisprudence that flows from Mallinckrodt. It did not overrule (or
even question) its General Talking Pictures precedent on which
Mallinckrodt is based—the Court pointed out that unlike the license at
216. See id. at 2122 n.7.
217. See generally Greg A. McAllister, Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics: The Supreme Court
Applies Its Patent Exhaustion Precedent and Rejects Recent Federal Circuit Modifications to the
Doctrine, CASRIP NEWSL. (Ctr. for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop., Seattle,
W a s h . ) , S u m m e r 2 0 0 8 , h t tp : // w w w . l a w . w a sh in g to n . e d u / c as r i p /n e ws l e t te r / v o l 1 5 /
newsv15i2QuantaLG.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
84washlrev199n217.pdf.
218. Quanta, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2117–21.
219. Id. at 2121 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 2113. “Intel’s authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the scope of the
patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no longer assert its patent rights against Quanta.” Id. at
2122.
221. Id. at 2122.
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issue in General Talking Pictures, LG Electronics’ license did not place
conditions on Intel’s sales.222 The Supreme Court’s basis for reversal
came down to something quite simple: the Federal Circuit found, in its
reading of the license agreements, conditions on Intel’s ability to sell;
and the Supreme Court, in its reading, did not. This decision is not the
grand, course-altering ruling that many had asked for. Instead, by its
approach, the Quanta Computer decision quietly affirmed Mallinckrodt
and its progeny.223
The fundamental teaching of Mallinckrodt (drawing on earlier
Supreme Court precedent) is that an intellectual property holder may
place conditions on a license or sale. That remains the law after Quanta
Computer.224 Justice Thomas’ opinion for the Court spent considerable
time examining the details of the LG–Intel transactions to see if any
conditions existed.225 This made sense because the presence or absence
of license conditions makes all the difference in whether a downstream
sale is authorized or not. Finding no conditions, it was easy for the Court
to rule that the license authorized Intel’s sale, and it therefore exhausted
LG Electronics’ patents.
C.

Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s First Sale Jurisprudence:
Comparison to Other United States Circuit Courts

This section compares the Federal Circuit’s first sale jurisprudence
with the jurisprudence of other courts, particularly other federal circuit
courts. This analysis includes copyright first sale cases as well as patentexhaustion cases. Copyrights and patents are very different types of

222. See id.
223. But see McAllister, supra note 217, at Part I (“The case overturns the Federal Circuit’s
patent exhaustion jurisprudence, under which patent rights were exhausted only by unconditional
sales . . . .”). Mr. McAllister’s conclusion does not seem supported by the Court’s reasoning in
Quanta Computer. Justice Thomas’s opinion did not announce a new “rule” about first sale, and he
did not renounce the Federal Circuit’s approach. Instead, the Supreme Court paid special attention
to whether the parties had placed conditions on Intel’s sales (and ultimately found that they had not,
at least none that were binding). Moreover, as to the characterization that Quanta Computer creates
a new “rule,” the Supreme Court has been particularly averse to establishing rigid rules in patentrelated cases. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by
rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”); see also eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
224. See Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta, Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 7 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 682, 694–95 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court overruled B. Braun sub
silentio but did not overrule Mallinckrodt).
225. Quanta, 533 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2121–22.
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intellectual property to be sure, and there may be occasions when their
differences justify different treatment of the use of contracts to
commercialize intellectual property.226 However, the first sale doctrines
are closely related and raise many of the same policy issues. Courts,
including the Supreme Court, have on many occasions drawn on
precedents from one type of intellectual property to decide cases in the
other.227
1.

Patent Exhaustion

The Federal Circuit has decided most of the patent-exhaustion cases,
but the Ninth Circuit recently examined a post-sale restriction on printer
cartridges in Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark
International Inc.228 The procedural posture of this case was atypical,229
but the court ruled directly that Lexmark could, as a matter of law,
enforce a post-sale restriction on reuse of printer cartridges. Applying
California contract law230 the court held:
[T]he contract on its face appears to be enforceable based on the
district court’s findings that consumers (1) have notice of the
condition, (2) have a chance to reject the contract on that basis,
and (3) receive consideration in the form of a reduced price in
exchange for the limits placed on the reuse of the cartridge.231

226. See Patterson, supra note 112, at 160–61.
227. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (using
patent law’s staple article in commerce doctrine to decide copyright contributory infringement
case); see also cases cited supra, note 99.
228. 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005).
229. The enforceability of the contract was raised in the context of a consumer-protection
violation: the plaintiff alleged that Lexmark’s assertion that it could enforce a post-sale restriction
was wrong as a matter of law, and was therefore an unfair and deceptive practice. Id. at 985. To
resolve the consumer-protection issue, the Ninth Circuit had to decide the issue of contract
enforceability. Id. at 986–88.
230. The district court had relied extensively on Mallinckrodt, but the Ninth Circuit went back to
first principles and relied on California contract law. See id. at 986–88. The Electronic Frontier
Foundation urged the Ninth Circuit to use the Arizona Cartridge case as a vehicle to reject the
Mallinckrodt case, but the court did not take the bait, saying that the plaintiff did not raise the
argument on appeal and had conceded in its brief that “the otherwise unfettered use of a patented
good can be constrained.” Id. at 987.
231. Id. at 988. Unlike many other patent first sale cases, the court did not need to examine
whether Lexmark was acting beyond the scope of its patent. The plaintiff had not raised the
argument on appeal and had conceded in its brief that “the otherwise unfettered use of a patented
good can be constrained.” Id. at 987.
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2.

Copyright First Sale

Many of the early copyright-related cases challenging post-sale
conditions on use232 came out of the software industry. In these cases,
the software user challenged conditions on use of the software,233
arguing that he or she had acquired the software as a first sale under the
Copyright Act and, as such, the license conditions were preempted by
Section 301 of the Copyright Act and could be ignored.234 One of the
first cases to address the issue of potential Copyright Act preemption235
of software end-user licenses was National Car Rental System, Inc. v.
Computer Associates International, Inc.236 In National Car Rental, the
232. Conditions on “use” must be analyzed differently in the context of licenses of various types
of intellectual property. In patent law, the right to control “use” is one of the exclusive rights of the
patent holder. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (discussing patentee’s right to exclude others from
making, using, or offering the patented invention for sale). In trademark and trade secret licensing,
setting parameters on use of a trademark or trade secret is the very essence of the license grant. In
copyright law, the right to control “use” is not one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder
(copyrights include the exclusive right to copy, distribute, create derivative works, and publicly
perform or display under 17 U.S.C. § 106). However, in a copyright license, a license grant
describing permissible uses sometimes implicates one of the exclusive rights, such as the right to
copy or create derivative works. Other times, however, a grant controlling “use” means simply that.
In the latter case, if the licensee’s use exceeds the scope of use granted, then the cause of action is
for breach of contract rather than a copyright infringement. See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v.
Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 427 (8th Cir. 1993) (addressing a state-law breach-ofcontract claim alleging that the licensee of computer software exceeded limitations on the use of
computer software contained in the license agreements).
233. Many cases were also decided on contract-formation grounds. Courts across circuits and
state courts have applied modern contract-formation rules, finding an enforceable contract in some
cases but not others. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002);
Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); M.A. Mortenson
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000).
234. The Copyright Act provides the exclusive source of protection for “all legal and equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights” granted by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §
301(a) (2006). The Copyright Act’s Section 301 expressly preempts any state law that attempts to
provide equivalent rights. Conversely, of course, the Copyright Act does not prevent state law from
enforcing non-equivalent legal or equitable rights.
235. A classic state-statute preemption case in the area of end user licensing was Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the
Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, which permitted software publishers to enforce terms
against end users provided that the terms were in a license comporting with the statute. According to
the statute, enforceable terms “include the prohibition of: (1) any copying of the program for any
purpose; and (2) modifying and/or adapting the program in any way, including adaptation by
reverse engineering, decompiliation or disassembly.” Id. at 268–69. The Fifth Circuit held that the
Louisiana statute conflicted with the rights of computer-program owners conferred in Section 117 of
the Copyright Act, which permits the owner of a copy to make certain adaptations that are essential
steps in the utilization of the program and to make archival copies. Id. at 270.
236. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Eight Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not preempt a contractual
limitation on the licensee’s ability to use the software in certain ways.237
Other courts have agreed with respect to contractual constraints on
copyrighted works, including courts from the Fourth,238 Fifth,239 Sixth,240
and Seventh Circuits.241
Most famously, in ProCD v. Zeidenberg,242 the Seventh Circuit held
that enforcement of a shrinkwrap license for ProCD’s software and
database product was not preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright
Act.243 In that case, Mr. Zeidenberg acquired a version of ProCD’s
software and database product that was licensed solely for internal
private use.244 If a user wanted to use ProCD’s product for commercial
purposes, it could obtain such a license for a higher fee. Mr. Zeidenberg
ignored the limited license grant by hosting the database on the Internet
for public use and access.245 The Seventh Circuit ruled that Mr.
Zeidenberg had seen the license, assented to it, and was therefore bound
by it.246
The court in ProCD ruled that, generally speaking,247 claims for
breach of a license contract are not equivalent to claims of copyright
infringement.248 The court reasoned that: “A copyright is a right against
237. Id. at 433.
238. See Acorn Structures Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
239. See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990).
240. See Wrench, L.L.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001).
241. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). In addition, intuiting
First Circuit law, the Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. held that a “no
reverse engineering” clause in a shrinkwrap license was not preempted by the Copyright Act. 320
F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
242. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
243. Id. at 1455.
244. Id. at 1449.
245. The end user in the ProCD case was notified of the license condition on four separate
occasions (on the product packaging, in the user guide, upon installation of the software, and prior
to gaining access to the product’s data). The end user’s explanation for violating the condition was
not that he did not know about it, but that he thought it was unenforceable (i.e., essentially a legal
conclusion). See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 651 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (“In
defendant’s view, the contract for the sale of SelectPhone was completed at the time of sale and the
license represents additional terms to which they cannot be bound . . . .”).
246. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
247. The court cautioned that it is “prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the
label ‘contract’ is necessarily outside the preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too
numerous to foresee.” 86 F.3d at 1455.
248. See Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market License Terms
Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 621 (2006)
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the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties;
strangers may do as they please,249 so contracts do not create ‘exclusive
rights.’”250 In other words, a license is not equivalent to a copyright
because a license allots rights only between specific parties bound by a
contractual relationship and does not represent a general right to exclude
all parties, as a copyright does.251 While academic commentators love to
hate the ProCD case,252 most courts have followed its approach.253
For example, in Blizzard Entertainment Inc. v. Jung,254 the Eighth
Circuit rejected a conflict-preemption claim relating to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA).255 The case addressed whether a
“no reverse engineering clause” in a mass-market license is preempted
by Section 1201(f) of the DMCA, which provides an interoperability
exception to the Act’s prohibition on circumventing copyright protection
devices.256 The users of Blizzard Entertainment’s software had agreed to
either a boot-screen license or an online “terms of use” license. Both
licenses prohibited the act of reverse engineering the software.257 The
users nonetheless reverse engineered Blizzard Entertainment’s software
games to discover protocols so that they could create a gaming website

(arguing that patent law, rather than copyright law, should be the proper focus of preemption
analysis in cases of reverse engineering).
249. Some commentators argue that mass-market licenses, in reality, create something more like
an in rem right. See, e.g., id. at 674–77.
250. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
251. Some courts use the term “extra element” to explain the point about non-equivalency
between contract rights and copyrights. They note that a breach-of-contract claim has an extra
element that a copyright-infringement claim does not, namely proof of contractual relationship. The
need to prove the existence of this relationship in a breach-of-contract case makes a contract claim
different from a copyright claim. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823
(10th Cir. 1993) (trade-secret claim not preempted by copyright claim); Baltimore Orioles v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
252. See Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious, supra note 33, at 687 (noting that in the past twenty
years over one hundred scholarly articles have been written on the subject of mass-market software
licenses, most of them critical, and many of them criticizing the ProCD decision on various
grounds). For a recent example, see Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License?
Contracting Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93
(2006).
253. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 538; LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW
337 (3d ed. 2006) (“Since ProCD, a majority of courts have enforced shrinkwrap licenses.”).
254. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
255. Id. at 640–41.
256. Id. at 637.
257. Id. at 635–36.
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that worked with the games.258 Blizzard Entertainment sued for breach
of contract. The Eighth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs had contractually
accepted restrictions on their ability to reverse engineer Blizzard
Entertainment’s software and that the bargain was permissible under
copyright law.259 The court held that enforcement of the contract does
not conflict with the interoperability exception in the DMCA.260
The Ninth Circuit recently summed up the state of play for challenges
related to first sale in software cases:
Generally, if the copyright holder makes it clear that she or he is
granting only a license to the copy of software and imposes
significant restrictions on the purchaser’s ability to redistribute
or transfer that copy, the purchaser is considered a licensee, not
an owner, of the software. . . . Indeed, the first sale doctrine
rarely applies in the software world because software is rarely
“sold.”261
VI. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STEWARDSHIP OF LICENSING
LAW
A.

Upholding the Use of Licenses in Technological and BusinessModel Innovation

This Article began by describing how licenses play a vital role in the
information economy. Licenses underlie the creation and distribution of
ideas, information, inventions, and works. People use licenses to build
products and create customer solutions; they use them to distribute
products and enable use.262 Licenses lie at the center of both
technological and business-model innovation. Both types of innovation
are critical to success in the information economy.
The Federal Circuit is well positioned to observe the use of licenses in
the information economy because cases involving ideas and inventions

258. Id. at 637.
259. Id. at 638.
260. One recent commentator disagrees with this outcome. See Laster, supra note 248, at 693–
701.
261. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 785, 785 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006).
262. Although much of the discussion supra focuses on information technology, licensing is also
important in other areas of the economy. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control
Commercialization of Stem Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017
(2006).
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make up the court’s standard diet.263 For example, the court recently
decided an important case addressing licensing of open source
software.264 The Federal Circuit sees not only innovative technology, but
also the innovative ways that people assemble and distribute that
technology. In other words, the court is a technology expert and a
technology-business expert. This expertise has broadened as patent cases
now involve a wide range of inventions such as software and business
methods.265 Moreover, innovation-related cases today involve more than
only patents;266 it is now common for the court, in the same case, to see
the application of copyright,267 trademark, trade secret, contract, and
patent law to various aspects of a product and the strategy to take that
product to market.268
The Federal Circuit’s expertise in technology businesses brings an
important perspective to licensing cases. A court needs to appreciate the
ramifications that its decisions will have on business-model innovation.
Without this sensitivity, a court can unduly disrupt efficient business

263. In addition to the cases described supra, as the court that reviews government-contract
appeals, the Federal Circuit sees many cases involving intellectual property, software, and
information licenses between firms and the United States government. See, e.g., Campbell Plastics,
Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 757–
868 (describing licensing in the government-contracts setting); Danielle Conway-Jones, Research
and Development Deliverables Under Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Development
Agreements and CRADAs, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 181 (2004).
264. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see generally Gomulkiewicz, supra note
41.
265. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesAndNoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
266. The Federal Circuit is often perceived as an expert in all types of intellectual property, not
just patents. See Lawrence Rosen, Bad Facts Make Good Law: The Jacobsen Case and Open
Source,
Nov.–Dec.
2008,
at
1,
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n266.pdf (“The Jacobsen case found its
way to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), arguably the most important court
short of the U.S. Supreme Court for intellectual property matters.” (emphasis added)).
267. Arguably some of the most important contemporary copyright cases and issues deal with the
distribution of copyright works rather than the creative process. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning
Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2003). In terms of cases, see, for
example, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). In terms of issues, the Google
Books Library Project is a good example. See Google Book Search Library Project,
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009), permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n267.pdf.
268. See e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (copyrights,
contracts, patents); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (contracts, trade
secrets, patents); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(copyrights and patents).
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practices269 and, in some cases, threaten the viability of certain
industries.270 Lack of licensing-law expertise may also mean that a court
will fail to appreciate the implications that a ruling in an area of law may
have on the business practices of innovators.271 The Federal Circuit
understands that licensing is just as important to MySQL272 as it is to
Monsanto.273
The Federal Circuit’s general approach to cases involving complex,
modern licensing models is to leave them intact.274 This approach began
in Mallinckrodt and continued through the Monsanto cases and on to LG
Electronics.
That is not to say that the Federal Circuit is an uncritical judge of
licensing. The court does not seem willing to tolerate shoddy contracting
practices.275 Additionally, it has been careful to assure that a license
269. See Colloquy, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream Licensing Restrictions, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025, 1040 (2006) (quoting Dick Ulmer, counsel in
Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturing Ass’n v. Lexmark International, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2005), speaking about Lexmark: “Lexmark was very careful in structuring this program. They very
closely followed the Mallinckrodt case, which was of great interest to them. The other key case in
this field, although it is not a patent case, is the ProCD case, which, to our mind, is the key case.”);
Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33.
270. See Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Contract and Contracts Are Not at War, 87 CAL. L. REV. 79
(1999) (explaining how the information industry relies on licenses in light of Feist Publications,
Inc. v. World Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), a case which makes more difficult to
claim a copyright in a database).
271. See O’Connor, supra note 109 (pointing out that the Supreme Court’s decision in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), had significant negative unintended
consequences for the university technology-transfer community’s licensing practices).
272. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source Hackers—MySQL and Its
Dual Licensing, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 203 (2004); see also Progress Software Corp. v.
MySQL AB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); see generally Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing
Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); Jason B.
Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451
(2005); Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability
of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2000); WEBER, supra note 26, at
190–223.
273. Monsanto has not always been on the winning side. See Rhone Poulnec Agro S.A. v.
DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting bona-fide-purchaser defense
raised by Monsanto).
274. See generally U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(patent package licensing); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(copier equipment and maintenance policy); Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (end-user software license); discussion of the Mallinckrodt, Monsanto, and LG
Electronics cases, supra Part V.B.
275. See Hewlett Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (re-use of printer ink cartridges); Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (single-use cameras); cf. Campbell Plastics Eng’g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389
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grant is within with scope of the patent rights.276 The court recognizes
that business practices that expand the scope of a patent or become part
of an anticompetitive practice are out of bounds.277 When litigants raise
challenges of this nature, however, the Federal Circuit seems to take
great care to examine the business context.
A good example is the court’s decision in U.S. Philips Corp. v.
International Trade Commission.278 In that case, a licensee argued that
U.S. Philips’ package patent-licensing arrangement for recordable and
rewritable CDs constituted patent misuse because both essential and
non-essential patents were licensed for one price in one non-divisible
package. The Federal Circuit performed a detailed analysis of the
licensing practice as it related to the market and finally upheld U.S.
Philips’ business model “[i]n light of the efficiencies of package patent
licensing.”279 In reaching its conclusion the court analogized Philips’
patent package licensing to the package copyright-licensing scheme that
the Supreme Court approved in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.280
One of the most telling examples of the Federal Circuit’s approach to
modern licensing practice can be found in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc.281 In that case, a developer of computer aided design
(CAD) software attempted to enforce a prohibition on reverse
engineering embodied in a shrinkwrap license. The licensee, like many
licensees before it, argued that the license was preempted under Section
301 of the Copyright Act. The Federal Circuit, citing several prior circuit
court decisions, turned aside this challenge.
The more difficult question, however, was whether the licensee’s
conduct was permitted as a “fair use” under the Copyright Act. This
question presented a direct collision between freedom of contract and a

F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (government-contract licensing case).
276. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
277. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
278. 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (intuiting the Tenth Circuit’s approach, the Federal Circuit refused to impose
antitrust liability for unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
195 F.23d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (vacating preliminary-injunction remedy of mandatory disclosure
of trade secrets and other provision of intellectual property).
279. U.S. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1193.
280. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (discussing the efficiencies of ASCAP and BMI public-performance
copyright licensing and ruling the licensing scheme was not a per se violation of antitrust law).
281. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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statutory defense to copyright infringement.282 Indeed, the Federal
Circuit had previously stated that reverse engineering software might be
a fair use under the Copyright Act.283 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit
concluded:
[P]rivate parties are free to contractually forego the limited
ability to reverse engineer a software product under the
exemptions of the Copyright Act. Of course, a party bound by
such a contract may elect to efficiently breach the agreement in
order to ascertain ideas in a computer program unprotected by
copyright law. Under such circumstances, the breaching party
must weigh the benefits of breach against the arguably de
minimis damages arising from merely discerning non-protected
code.284
In other words, the Federal Circuit is willing to let technology
businesses innovate in their business models as well as with their
technology. Some licensing practices may rise to the level of misuse,
violate antitrust laws, or be unenforceable because of faulty contract
formation. Outside of that, the Federal Circuit has carefully stewarded
modern licensing practices against judicial interference.
Some might wonder whether the Federal Circuit has demonstrated a
“pro licensor” bias in its jurisprudence in the same way that many have
alleged that the court has a “pro patentee” bias.285 It is important to note
that many scholars now believe that concerns over a pro-patentee bias
“have largely abated.”286 Some scholars who have studied the Federal
Circuit’s first sale jurisprudence seem to think that it favors patent
licensors.287 By and large, however, courts at all levels and in all
jurisdictions seem to favor licensors in the majority of cases.288 There is
nothing in my reading of the Federal Circuit’s case law to indicate that
the Federal Circuit favors licensors more than any other federal or state
282. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 38–39.
283. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
284. Id. at 1325–26.
285. See Janicke & Ren, supra note 14, at 38 (“The Federal Circuit has often been accused of
having a pro-patent leaning.”).
286. Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 770; see also Janicke & Ren, supra note 14, at 38 (“There is
nothing in our findings that would support [a pro-patent leaning] view.”).
287. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 112.
288. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60, (2006) (“Every court to
consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . enforceable. A majority of courts in the past
ten years have enforced shrinkwrap licenses . . . Finally, and more recently, an increasing number of
courts have enforced ‘browsewrap’ licenses . . . .”).
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court.289 However, further study may reveal (or put to rest) such a
concern.290 Most significantly, the stereotypical picture of a large,
powerful licensor and a small, weak licensee does not reflect the
complex realities of the information economy in which licensors and
licensees come in all shapes and sizes,291 as illustrated so well by open
source software licensing.292
The Federal Circuit’s approach to modern licensing generally lines up
well with the approach of other courts, especially other federal circuit
courts. Litigants and commentators have challenged modern licensing
practices on first sale,293 preemption,294 misuse,295 antitrust,296 and fairuse297 grounds. As previously discussed, by and large, courts have turned
289. Compare, e.g., Hewlett Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445
(Fed. Cir. 1997) with Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (closely
examining contract formation in both cases). See also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware
Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (ruling for the licensee over Judge
Radar’s dissent, and carefully construing a license for software repair and maintenance while
tackling several challenging license-interpretation issues, including the intersection between the
license and 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000)).
290. Cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse For Buyers?
Evidence From Software License Agreements, LAW & ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO. 05-10 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 7, 2005, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n290.pdf (finding that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the substantive terms of “pay now, terms later” licenses are actually better in
most cases than terms where assent is manifest in advance of payment); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice
Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111 (2008)
(challenging conventional wisdom that the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Texas should be
considered a notorious haven for patent litigation).
291. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33.
292. For a recent example, see Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which
involves a dispute over interpretation of the Artistic License used with open source software used by
model railroad enthusiasts.
293. See, e.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale
Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004).
294. See, e.g., Dennis J. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U.
DAYTON. L. REV. 511 (1997); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995).
295. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir.
2003); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Va. Panel
Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing threat to void warranty not
patent misuse).
296. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
297. See, e.g., Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006);
Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). In the Federal Circuit, see Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and DSC Communication Corp. v. Pulse
Communication, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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aside these challenges, refusing to meddle in the market.298 Even the
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies decision, which arguably presents one
of the most challenging intersections between contract and intellectualproperty law,299 is in the mainstream300 and has been directly
followed.301
The Federal Circuit’s approach also seems to line up well with the
Supreme Court’s approach.302 As a general proposition, the Supreme
Court has upheld freedom of contract and modern contracting
practices.303 The Supreme Court has not tolerated attempts to extend
298. In addition to the Specht, Arizona Cartridge, Blizzard Entertainment, National Car Rental,
and ProCD cases discussed supra Part V.C, there are several other pertinent cases. See, e.g., Micro
Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d
782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993);
I-A Equip. Co. v. I-Code, Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000); M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000). While
upholding modern licensing practices as a general rule, courts have not enforced all licenses or
license terms, particularly where the licensor did not provide a meaningful opportunity to review the
terms or there was no meaningful manifestation of assent, or where a term was unconscionable or
violated antitrust law or constituted a misuse of intellectual property. The Specht and Arizona Retail
cases, for example, approved of some license transactions but found others to be unenforceable
because of shoddy contracting practices. The courts in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), Acatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999),
and Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, L.L.C. v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003)
refused to enforce the copyright because certain provisions in software licenses amounted to a
“misuse” of the copyright. In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the
court held that provisions in Microsoft’s OEM licenses were used to illegally maintain its Windows
software monopoly. Several courts have refused to enforce mandatory arbitration, choice-of-law or
venue provisions in consumer licenses, finding them unconscionable. See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding mandatory arbitration provision
unconscionable); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998); Comb v. Paypal, Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
299. In Bowers, the court considered whether a contractual limitation on reverse engineering
should be enforceable. This pits the notions of freedom and certainty of contract against the notion
of a copyright being a limited exclusive right. See David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract:
Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 595 (2004) (criticizing the
Bowers v. Baystate decision).
300. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir.
2003).
301. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
302. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 29 (“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s own patent
jurisprudence is mostly quite old, limiting its value as a guide to the most pressing unresolved issues
of today.”)
303. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 586 (1991); Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see generally 1 E.A. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS 4.26–4.27 (1990); Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990)
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patent or copyright monopolies,304 but in intellectual-property licensing,
the Supreme Court has upheld a license against a challenge that the
license was preempted by federal patent law305 and recognized the
importance of trade-secret licensing to the dissemination of
knowledge.306 One could also read the Supreme Court’s rather narrow
decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.307 as encouraging
innovative business practices except when the practices strongly
encourage infringing activities. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent
approach in technology-related antitrust cases seems to favor giving
breathing space to evolving business practices.308
B.

Future Licensing-Law Cases

The Federal Circuit’s strong influence over the shape of licensing law
should remind the court to take special care in its licensing cases,
acknowledging the broad impact of its rulings. Thus far, the Federal
Circuit has been adept, as discussed, at being a good steward of licensing
practices that promote technological and business-model innovation.
Providing an analysis of whether and how its rules in patent-licensing
(“Ours is not a bazaar economy in which the terms of every transaction, or even of most
transactions, are individually dickered; even when they are, standard clauses are commonly
incorporated into the final contract, without separate negotiation of each of them.”).
304. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (attempted
use of trade dress after patent had expired); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539
U.S. 23 (2003) (attempted use of Lanham Act to extend copyright protection).
305. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979). But see Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (declining to enforce licensee estoppel term).
306. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974) (“Another problem that
would arise if state trade secret protection were precluded is in this area of licensing others to
exploit secret processes. The holder of the trade secret would not likely share his secret with a
manufacturer who cannot be placed under binding legal obligation to pay a license fee or to protect
the secret. The result would be to hoard rather than to disseminate knowledge.”).
307. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Many believed that the Supreme Court would use the Grokster case to
update its jurisprudence on secondary liability for copyright infringement. The Court, however,
declined to do so and instead based its ruling on the evidence before it, which showed pervasive
inducement to infringe. 545 U.S. at 934–40. This, in effect, allowed a variety of file-sharing
business models to survive so long as the proprietors did not promote themselves in the manner that
the defendants had in Grokster.
308. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (ruling that one
cannot presume a patent confers market power, leaving in place a business practice whereby OEMs
are required to buy both unpatented and patented ink cartridges); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (refusing to find that an alleged
violation of 1996 Telecommunications Act states a claim for a “refusal to deal” under the Sherman
Act).
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cases should apply to copyright, trademark, trade secret, and information
licensing would be a useful guide for other courts that often apply
Federal Circuit patent-licensing cases by analogy. Special care should be
taken, as it was in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil
Manufacturing Corp.,309 when it comes to applying basic contract-law
principles to licensing practices.310 It appears that the downfall of the
Federal Circuit in Quanta Computer may have been its eagerness to find
binding contract terms (and binding contractual conditions), which were
not warranted by the facts. And finally, as the Supreme Court did in
Univis Lens (a case re-affirmed in Quanta Computer), the Federal
Circuit should be ready to strike down licensing practices that violate
licensing-law boundaries such as misuse, antitrust, and unconscionable
terms. Such an approach would ensure good stewardship of the balance
between exclusive rights and public uses, which is fundamental in our
intellectual-property laws.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has become one of the
most influential actors in the creation of licensing law. Licensing law has
developed as common law in the aftermath of failed efforts to codify it.
In this setting, state and federal courts now look to the Federal Circuit
for guidance when deciding licensing-related cases. The Federal
Circuit’s influence reaches across industries, regions, and types of
intellectual property. The court’s approach to licensing law has been
simple but powerful: let modern licensing practices flourish, hemmed in
only when such practices run afoul of misuse, antitrust, or contractformation issues. Given the importance of licensing in the information
economy to the development and distribution of products as diverse as
open source software and soybean seed, the wisdom of this approach
will play an important role in the United States’ ability to innovate and
compete in the world economy.

309. 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
310. For one critique, see Kaiser, supra note 11.
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APPENDIX I: COURTS CITING FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES
Issue

Case

Court

Type

Copyright:

Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino

C.A.9 (Cal.)

Circuit

choice of law

270 F.3d 821

C.A.9 (Cal.)

Circuit

C.A.7 (Ind.)

Circuit

C.A.9 (Cal.)

Circuit

C.A.6 (Ohio)

Circuit

D. Del

District

C.A.9 (Cal.)

Circuit

D. Colo.

District

N.D. Ill.

District

W.D. Tenn.

District

C.A.9 (Cal.), 2001
Copyright:

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.

misuse / antitrust

239 F.3d 1004
C.A.9 (Cal.), 2001

Copyright/software:

Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. Dharma

reverse engineering

Systems, Inc.
148 F.3d 649
C.A.7 (Ind.), 1998

Patents:

In re CFLC, Inc.

choice of law

89 F.3d 673
C.A.9 (Cal.), 1996

Patents:

Boggild v. Kenner Products, Div. of CPG

choice of law

Products Corp.
853 F.2d 465
C.A.6 (Ohio), 1988

Patents:

Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp.

choice of law

173 F. Supp. 2d 201
D. Del., 2001

Trademark:

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.

assignment / license-

955 F.2d 1327

back as evidence of

C.A.9 (Cal.), 1992

confusion
Patents:

University of Colorado Foundation, Inc.

infringement

v. American Cyanamid Co.

damages in terms of

216 F. Supp. 2d 1188

value of a license

D. Colo., 2002

Patents:

Cook Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.

implied license /

208 F. Supp. 2d 874

exhaustion

N.D. Ill., 2002

Patents:

Monsanto Co. v. Trantham

implied license /

156 F. Supp. 2d 855

exhaustion

W.D. Tenn., 2001
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Patents:

Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview

D. Conn.,

implied license /

Technologies, Inc.

2001.

exhaustion

157 F. Supp. 2d 172

District

D. Conn., 2001
Patents:

In re Singer Co., N.V.

Bkrtcy.

implied license /

262 B.R. 257

S.D.N.Y.

exhaustion

Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y., 2001

Patents:

Travelers Exp. Co., Inc. v. American Exp.

implied license /

Integrated Payment

exhaustion

80 F. Supp. 2d 1033

District

D. Minn.

District

D. Kan.

District

E.D.N.C.

District

E.D. Mich.

District

N.D. W. Va.

District

D. Mass.

District

N.D. Cal.

District

N.D. Ill.

District

D. Minn., 1999
Patents:

U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc.

implied license /

5 F. Supp. 2d 1201

exhaustion

D. Kan., 1998

Patents:

Cardiovascular Diagnostics Inc. v.

implied license /

Boehringer Mannheim Corp.

exhaustion

985 F. Supp. 615
E.D.N.C., 1997

Patents:

Empire Iron Works, Inc. v. Defender, Inc.

implied license /

992 F. Supp. 928

exhaustion

E.D. Mich., 1997

Patents:

Glass Equipment Development, Inc. v.

implied license /

Simonton Windows Co.

exhaustion

929 F. Supp. 227
N.D. W. Va., 1996

Patents:

Hoppe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.

implied license /

878 F. Supp. 303

exhaustion

D. Mass., 1995

Patents:

Lifescan, Inc. v. Can-Am Care Corp.

implied license /

859 F. Supp. 392

exhaustion

N.D. Cal., 1994

Patents:

Universal Electronics, Inc. v. Zenith

implied license /

Electronics Corp.

exhaustion

846 F. Supp. 641
N.D. Ill. 1994
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Patents:

Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp.

implied license /

803 F. Supp. 1200

E.D. Tex.

District

exhaustion

E.D. Tex. 1992

General:

In re Valley Media, Inc.

Bkrtcy. D.

District

contract interpretation

279 B.R. 105

Del.

Bkrtcy. D. Del., 2002
Patents:

Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp.

contract interpretation

173 F. Supp. 2d 201

D. Del.

District

District

D. Del., 2001
Patents:

In re Supernatural Foods, LLC

Bkrtcy. M.D.

contract interpretation

268 B.R. 759

La.

Bkrtcy. M.D. La., 2001
Patents:

Syndia Corp. v. Lemelson Medical

contract interpretation

Education and Research Foundation,

N.D. Ill.

District

E.D. Tex.

District

S.D.N.Y.

District

C.D. Cal.

District

W.D. Tenn.

District

N.D. Ala.

District

E.D. Mich.

District

165 F. Supp. 2d 728
N.D. Ill., 2001
Patents:

Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp.

contract interpretation

879 F. Supp. 672
E.D. Tex., 1995

Patents:

Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac

contract interpretation

Technology Development Corp.
690 F. Supp. 1339
S.D.N.Y., 1988

Copyright / software:

SoftMan Products Co., LLC v. Adobe

contract interpretation

Systems, Inc.
171 F. Supp. 2d 1075
C.D. Cal., 2001

Patents: antitrust

Monsanto Co. v. Trantham
156 F. Supp. 2d 855
W.D. Tenn., 2001

Patents: antitrust

Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.
88 F. Supp. 2d 1288
N.D. Ala., 2000

Patents: antitrust

Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp.
902 F. Supp. 741
E.D. Mich., 1995
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Patents: antitrust

Verson Corp. v. Verson Intern. Group

Vol. 84:199, 2009

N.D. Ill.

District

E.D. Va.

District

N.D. Ill.

District

E.D. Tex.

District

S.D. Iowa

District

N.D. Ga.

District

E.D. Mich.

District

E.D. Mich.

District

C.A.9 (Cal.)

Circuit

D. Del.

District

PLC
899 F. Supp. 358
N.D. Ill., 1995
Patents: standing

EyeTicket Corp. v. Unisys Corp.
155 F. Supp. 2d 527
E.D. Va., 2001

Patents: standing

Syndia Corp. v. Lemelson Medical
Education and Research Foundation,
165 F. Supp. 2d 728
N.D. Ill., 2001

Patent: misuse

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai
Electronics Industries, Co. Ltd.
49 F. Supp. 2d 893
E.D. Tex., 1999

Patent:

Marley Co. v. FE Petro, Inc.

shop right as a license

38 F. Supp. 2d 1070
S.D. Iowa, 1998

General: license as a

Ramada Franchise System v. Hotel of

transfer of the

Gainesville Associates

attorney-client

988 F. Supp. 1460

privilege

N.D. Ga., 1997

Copyright and

Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems

Patents: obligation to

Corp.

license to other users

902 F. Supp. 741
E.D. Mich., 1995

Copyright and

Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems

Patents: obligation to

Corp.

license to other users

902 F. Supp. 741
E.D. Mich., 1995

Trademarks:

Department of Parks and Recreation for

implied licenses

State of California v.
448 F.3d 1118
C.A.9 (Cal.), 2006

Patent:

Nutrasweet Co. v. Ajinomoto Co., Inc.

jurisdiction for

423 F. Supp. 2d 450

licensing matters

D. Del., 2006
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Patent:

Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese,

jurisdiction for

Inc.

E.D. Wis.

District

licensing matters

305 F. Supp. 2d 939

N.D. Ill.

District

W.D. Wis.

District

N.D. Tex.,

District

In re Hernandez

Bkrtcy. D.

District

285 B.R. 435

Ariz.

E.D. Wis., 2004
Patents:

Rowe Intern. Corp. v. Ecast, Inc.

contract interpretation

500 F. Supp. 2d 885,
N.D. Ill., 2007

Patents:

Dietrich v. Trek Bicycle Corp.

contract interpretation

297 F. Supp. 2d 1122
W.D. Wis., 2003

Patents:

Epic Systems Corp. v. Allcare Health

contract interpretation

Management System, Inc.
Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2002 WL
31051023
N.D. Tex., 2002

Patents:
contract interpretation

Bkrtcy. D. Ariz., 2002
Patents:

Rowe Intern. Corp. v. Ecast, Inc.

choice of law

500 F. Supp. 2d 885,

N.D. Ill.

District

E.D. Tex.

District

District

N.D. Ill., 2007
Patents:

Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co.

choice of law

490 F. Supp. 2d 756
E.D. Tex., 2007

Patents:

In re Nu-Corp Intern. Technologies, Inc.

Bkrtcy. N.D.

implied licenses /

362 B.R. 308

Miss.

exhaustion

Bkrtcy. N.D. Miss., 2007

Patents:

Innovative Engineering Solutions, Inc. v.

implied licenses /

Misonix, Inc.

exhaustion

458 F. Supp. 2d 1190

D. Or.

District

S.D.N.Y.

District

D.D.C.

District

D. Or., 2006
Patents:

Canon Inc. v. GCC Intern. Ltd.

implied licenses /

450 F. Supp. 2d 243

exhaustion

S.D.N.Y., 2006

Patents:

Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst

implied licenses /

444 F. Supp. 2d 68

exhaustion

D.D.C., 2006
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Patents:

Natterman & Cie GmbH v. Bayer Corp.

implied licenses /

428 F. Supp. 2d 253

exhaustion

E.D. Pa., 2006

Patents:

Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., Inc. v.

implied licenses /

Visteon Corp.

exhaustion

375 F. Supp. 2d 375

Vol. 84:199, 2009

E.D. Pa.

District

D. Del.

District

S.D.N.Y.

District

E.D. Mich.

District

N.D. Miss.

District

N.D. Miss.

District

S.D.N.Y.

District

N.D. Iowa

District

M.D. N.C.

District

N.D. Cal.

District

D. Del., 2005
Patents:

Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Altair Eyewear,

implied licenses /

Inc.

exhaustion

361 F. Supp. 2d 210
S.D.N.Y., 2005

Patents:

Melea Limited v. Quality Models Ltd.

implied licenses /

345 F. Supp. 2d 743

exhaustion

E.D. Mich., 2004

Patents:

Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs

implied licenses /

342 F. Supp. 2d 584

exhaustion

N.D. Miss., 2004

Patents – Implied

Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs

licenses/exhaustion

342 F. Supp. 2d 568
N.D. Miss., 2004

Patents:

AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.

implied licenses /

Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2004 WL

exhaustion

188078
S.D.N.Y., 2004

Patents:

Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. Ottawa

implied licenses /

Plant Food, Inc.

exhaustion

283 F. Supp. 2d 1018
N.D. Iowa, 2003

Patents:

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Solutia, Inc.

implied licenses /

256 F. Supp. 2d 433

exhaustion

M.D. N.C., 2003

Patents:

LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer,

implied licenses /

Inc.

exhaustion

248 F. Supp. 2d 912
N.D. Cal., 2003
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Patents:

Trustees of Columbia University in City

implied licenses /

of New York v. Roche

exhaustion

272 F. Supp. 2d 90

D. Mass.

District

S.D.N.Y.

District

D.N.J.

District

S.D.N.Y.

District

E.D. Wis.

District

S.D. Ohio

District

State

D. Mass., 2002
Patents:

In re The Singer Co., N.V.

implied licenses /

Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2002 WL

exhaustion

31040349
S.D.N.Y., 2002

Patents:

Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,

link between non-

Inc.

obviousness and

460 F. Supp. 2d 659

licensing

D.N.J., 2006

Patents:

Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Altair Eyewear,

licensee and standing

Inc.
361 F. Supp. 2d 210
S.D.N.Y., 2005

Patents:

Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese,

licensee and standing

Inc.
305 F. Supp. 2d 939
E.D. Wis., 2004

Patents:

Logan Farms v. HBH, Inc. DE

licensee and standing

282 F. Supp. 2d 776
S.D. Ohio, 2003

Patents:

Superbrace, Inc. v. Tidwell

Cal. App. 4

licensee and standing

124 Cal.App.4th 388, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 404

Dist.

Cal. App. 4 Dist., 2004
Patents:

InternetAd Systems, LLC v. Opodo Ltd.

licensee and standing

481 F. Supp. 2d 596

N.D. Tex.

District

D. Del.

District

E.D. Mo.

District

N.D. Tex., 2007
Patents:

Ciena Corp. v. Corvis Corp.

license as a defense

334 F. Supp. 2d 610
D. Del., 2004

Patents: compulsory

Monsanto Co. v. David

licensing and

448 F. Supp. 2d 1088

damages calculations

E.D. Mo., 2006

257

GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC

5/28/2009 10:46 AM

Washington Law Review

Copyright / Software:

Meridian Project Systems, Inc. v. Hardin

right to contract

Const. Co., LLC

(Bowers argument)

426 F. Supp. 2d 1101

Vol. 84:199, 2009

E.D. Cal.

District

N.D. Tex.

District

C.A.8 (Mo.)

Circuit

Circuit

E.D. Cal., 2006
Copyright / Software:

Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive

right to contract

Intelligence, Inc.

(Bowers argument)

425 F. Supp. 2d 756

Copyright / Software:

Davidson & Associates v. Jung

reverse engineering

422 F.3d 630

N.D. Tex., 2006

C.A.8 (Mo.), 2005
Copyright:

Ritchie v. Williams

C.A.6

jurisdiction for

395 F.3d 283

(Mich.)

licensing matters

C.A.6 (Mich.), 2005

General:

Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v.

contracts of adhesion

Atriums Partners, L.P.

D. Kan.

District

State

232 F. Supp. 2d 1257
D. Kan., 2002
General:

L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet,

N.Y.A.D. 1

standing

Inc.

Dept.

841 N.Y.S.2d 82
N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., 2007
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